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USA: Economics, Politics, Ideology

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Concept of 'Military-Industrial Complex' Questioned

18030010a Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 89 (signed to press 17 Mar 89) pp 3-13

[Article by Vladimir Antonovich Fedorovich, doctor of economic sciences and lead scientific associate at Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies: "United States: Militarism, Militarization, and the Military-Industrial Complex"; first two paragraphs are SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA introduction]

[Text] This article by Doctor of Economic Sciences V.A. Fedorovich, the author of many works on the U.S. economy and on state-monopolist capitalism in the United States, is printed in the form of a debate. The author questions the validity of the use of the term "military-industrial complex" (MIC), in reference to the capitalist world in general and the United States in particular, in our science, press, propaganda, and party documents.

This point of view is not new. Historian and political scientist I.I. Beglov expressed this opinion back in the early 1970's in the work "SShA: sobstvennost i vlast" [United States: Property and Power]. Today the concept of the "military-industrial complex" is a stereotype with a specific meaning. Marxist economists, political scientists, and sociologists have different views, however, on the actual mechanism, stimuli, and motives of the arms race and the militarization of the economy in the capitalist countries, especially the United States. The editors are printing V.A. Fedorovich's article only as the basis for extensive debate, because it only begins to answer several questions. The explanation the author suggests for the arms race instead of the military-industrial complex is evidently also debatable.

Today, now that non-standard thinking, the rejection of traditional approaches, and the search for new views of the deep-seated processes occurring in the world are a dictate of the times and of the general line of the CPSU and Soviet State, the need for the creative and discerning analysis and reassessment of tenacious stereotypical ideas about many of the complex phenomena in the modern capitalist society probably could not be more evident. After all, our basic assumptions in this sphere took shape over decades during the era of the cult of personality and the years of stagnation and have failed to withstand the test of time.

The Military-Industrial Complex: the Stereotype and Its Origins

Firmly ensconced views in our society lent credence to the belief in a special politico-military mechanism—the

military-industrial complex—in the West, especially in the United States. This is a widely used term in party and government documents. The MIC has been the subject of numerous works by numerous writers, from Marxist researchers to frank apologists for the military business, and has led to the expression of many different opinions in the press, on radio and television, and at countless conferences and symposiums. Although a consensus (or common opinion) seems to exist in our society with regard to this matter, the facts testify to frequent cases of oversimplification and stereotypical thinking, which can, regrettably, have far-reaching negative consequences.

The nature of the MIC in the United States, its essence and character, would seem to warrant thorough discussion primarily from the standpoint of the new political thinking and the new political economy of capitalism. I would like to make a few comments in this connection.

The non-traditional approach proves that although the term "military-industrial complex" would seem to have a definite meaning and that this is what has made it a part of common terminology, it is not an accurate reflection of the complex and contradictory socioeconomic and political processes in American state-monopolist capitalism connected with militarism, the militarization of the economy, and the arms race.

The term has become part of our works on ideology because it is easy to understand and is commonly used and also, quite frankly, because we have been reluctant to give up clichés "ordained from above." The term was coined, however, by the moderate ideologists of American bourgeois conservatism or, more precisely, by the critics of American imperialism's military policy.

We know that "military-industrial complex" was first used as a political term in 1961 by President D. Eisenhower of the United States in his address to the American people before he gave up his office to J. Kennedy. Eisenhower, a career military man with conservative or even radical political views, tried to invest the term with his own concern about the growing political influence in Washington of top-level military officials and the executives of military-industrial firms, the groups then advocating a dramatic buildup of U.S. military strength and initiating the idea of the "Soviet military threat."

The term was used later in various spheres of sociopolitical life in the United States. It entered Marxist literature as a result of our common tacit agreement that "even Eisenhower, the conservative captain of the American bourgeois ship, had to acknowledge its existence" and had to direct the attention of the American public to this mounting threat to peace.

The use of the term "military-industrial complex" by Marxists to define a specific political force—military industrialists and the upper echelons of the military establishment—was dictated by several considerations. First of all, there was the need to single out the main force in American imperialism to be the main target of

Marxist criticism by distinguishing it from other strata: small and middle property owners, the intelligentsia, the working class, the sociopolitical organizations of the laboring public, and other democratic forces—all of the elements of the anti-monopolist front.

Second, the term was also used as a result of the efforts to unite the anti-monopolist front under the banner of criticism of the MIC in the struggle against the arms race and for peace and international detente and to draw a clear distinction in the minds of millions of laborers between the egotistical goals of the rulers of "military-industrial empires" and "death merchants" and the vital interests of the American general public. To explain the main economic motives and prime movers of the MIC, we usually make stereotypical references to the colossal (incomparably higher than in the private market) profits of the corporations supplying military products—the reason for their misanthropic militarist activity which undermines the bases of the economy and poses a threat to peace.

In essence, the MIC is a common stereotype and political cliché denoting the elements of the "iron triangle"—the heads of military-industrial monopolies, the upper echelons of the military agencies of government, and their lobbies in the U.S. Congress, united by a common incentive to continue the arms race.

Whether we like it or not, however, the use of this thesis as one of our ideological tools is an acknowledgement, in the first place, that there is some kind of special group within American state-monopolist capitalism, the group of military monopolists, separate from the nucleus of the financial oligarchy and operating as a self-contained entity capable of exerting decisive pressure on domestic and foreign policymakers in the main capitalist country. In the second place, it is also an acknowledgement that the MIC is the main cause of the aggressive nature of American imperialism's foreign and domestic policy in general and of the arms race and the "crusade" against socialism in particular. In the third place, it is the assumption that the MIC in the United States, as the heart of the MIC of contemporary capitalism, is the main seat and basis of international tension and the chief opponent of detente and peaceful cooperation by the two systems.

If all of this were true, the colossal problems engendered by militarism, the militarization of the economy, and the arms race at the end of the 20th century could be solved quite easily. Progressive forces in the United States could get rid of the "sinister alliance of the military establishment and the monopolies" and the notorious "iron triangle," and the next day the country would set off on the road of peaceful coexistence and economic competition with socialism.

An unbiased analysis of the development of state-monopolist capitalism in the 1980's and of the structure of capitalist property in the United States, however,

indicates something different. The term "military-industrial complex" is of a relatively vague social nature, and its composition, boundaries, and functions are far from distinct. There is a much more complex and multifaceted socioeconomic and political phenomenon which does not fit into the framework of the "iron triangle" or the stereotypical term "military-industrial complex." It is connected with the distinctive features of the functioning of state-monopolist capitalism in the United States, especially the segment serving the interests of the military agencies of government. It concerns capital working for the military treasury in peacetime, competition between the two systems, and the arms race in the 1980's.

In terms of dimensions and socioeconomic features, this work for the treasury is similar to a huge cancerous growth on American state-monopolist capitalism, the site of clashes and connections between the sometimes coinciding but more frequently diametrically opposed interests of the working class and different segments of the bourgeoisie and also of other social strata.

This work for the treasury has a clearly defined economic content and a special sociopolitical framework. The former stems from the interest of various social groups in the American society in military contracts in peacetime: the military establishment, the petty, middle, and grand bourgeoisie, the scientific and technical community, and part of the working class. There is no question that this involvement has its own, often diametrically opposed socioeconomic and political causes.

In the political context this work for the treasury is reflected in the continued militarization of the economy, politics, and ideology. It is connected with the transformation of militarism into an important but far from necessary element of the domestic and foreign policy of American state-monopolist capitalism in peacetime and during a new stage of the technological revolution. The focal point of this militarist policy line is its long-range anti-Soviet and anticommunist goals.

It appears that this feature of American state-monopolist capitalism reflects the interests of not only the MIC—the small group of military-industrial corporations, the military upper echelon, and their lobbies in government—but also the reactionary extremist wing of the American monopolist bourgeoisie and its financial oligarchy: the lords of banking and industry and of the scientific and technical establishment.

These are the internal American reactionary forces that are still relying on a long-term arms race as the main way of undermining the military balance between our countries and between socialism and capitalism and are relying on the achievement of military superiority to socialism and the exertion of military-economic pressure on it, in contrast to the sensible members of the American bourgeoisie who have made persistent attempts to strengthen relations with the USSR. All of the actions of the former are aimed at the use of the arms race to "drive

socialism into a corner" and to undermine the economy of the USSR with the burden of military expenditures and military-technical rivalry.

This policy line is based on the firm conviction of part of the U.S. ruling class that socialism is supposedly suffering from socioeconomic and political weakness and a crisis of the economy, science, technology, and agriculture. The arms race in the United States has also been escalated by the belief of aggressive groups in that country in the technological gap between the United States and USSR and their interest in the quicker military use of the latest achievements of scientific and technical progress—the bases of the new phase of the technological revolution: microelectronics, composites, data processing equipment, laser technology, optoelectronics, cosmology, and biotechnology. Finally, there are also the significant assumptions regarding the allegedly mounting conflicts within CEMA countries and the "possible disintegration" of this system in the future.

Although the profound changes taking place in the USSR today in politics, economics, ideology, and culture and embodying the new historic policy line of the CPSU and the new political thinking, are heartily applauded by the American general public, the reactionary wing of the U.S. monopolist bourgeoisie has been regrettably reluctant to give up its attempts to use military-economic and military-technical competition to cause the USSR's regression into a second-rate power.

The Means of Accomplishing the Militarization of the Economy and the Arms Race

Why does the term "military-industrial complex" not reveal the complex political mechanism forcing the United States to begin each new round of the arms race and strive for the military-technical and economic suffocation of socialism? What is the "iron triangle"? Is it an alliance of military firms, the military upper echelon, and their lobbies in Congress, as its bourgeois radical critics often say? Are other, unseen but influential social and political forces hiding behind them? What are the actual features of the internal mechanism of the arms race, the militarization of the economy, and the nurturing of militarism in the country? What place does it occupy within American state-monopolist capitalism? Finally, is it true that the "alliance of the military establishment and the monopolies" is the political force wholly responsible for defining the domestic and foreign policy canons of the main capitalist country? Who controls the military-industrial business, and who works for the U.S. military market? What are its functions and components?

We will begin with a discussion of the military monopolies—the material base of the MIC. The United States has virtually no purely military-industrial firms, firms producing items exclusively for the military market, and this is extremely important. The only exceptions are the five or ten companies producing firearms only on government contracts. Only from five to seven of the main

military-industrial firms supply the military market on a large scale—up to 20-40 percent of their total product: Boeing, Lockheed, General Dynamics, Grumman, McDonnell Douglas, United Technologies, and Raytheon. In the United States there are essentially no inherited family businesses in the military industry belonging completely to one or two families of large property owners. Traditionally, the large military-industrial companies, the Pentagon's main suppliers, have been ordinary industrial corporations or even conglomerates: General Electric, Teledyne, Ling-Temco-Vought, United Technologies, General Motors, and others. These are monopolistic production associations as well as large military-industrial firms with widely diversified production. They produce a broad range of civilian and military items, from atomic bombs, guns, tanks, ships, planes, missiles, and submarines to automobiles, machine tools, electrical equipment, instruments, railroad cars, and other equipment, including mini-computers, children's toys, and even packaged foods. These corporations, the treasury's military suppliers, are usually joint-stock companies belonging to a group of shareholders or, more precisely, to various financial groups. They are controlled by banks and industrial corporations, by wealthy families, and sometimes by individuals. The corporations producing weapons belong to insurance and investment companies, banking trusts, pension and anonymous funds, and corporations managed by universities and other "non-profit organizations."

Furthermore, much of the stock in American military-industrial corporations belongs to foreign capital—from 5 to 10 percent. The American military business provides many examples shedding light on the organizational structure of this business, its material base, and the interconnected economic interests of various capitalist groups controlling the military market and its operations.

The Lockheed military-industrial concern, for example, is a joint-stock company with limited liability. Military contracts account for 30-40 percent of its production volume. Lockheed has been on the list of the Pentagon's 100 main suppliers for the last 20-30 years. Here is a list of the corporation's directors at the end of the 1970's: President F. Leary of Lockheed is the first vice president of the Bankers Trust Company (New York, Morgan financial group); J. Bryden is the first vice president of the Wells Fargo Bank (Chicago, Morgan financial group); J. Mitchell is the first vice president of the Chase Manhattan Bank (New York, Rockefeller financial group); R. Witt-Peterkin is the first vice president of the Morgan Guaranty Trust (New York, Morgan financial group); J. Ross is the first vice president of the Bank of America (the California financial group); R. Schur is the first vice president of the Continental Illinois Bank (Chicago financial group).

The "financial guarantors"—the concern's creditors and main shareholders—are 24 of the leading banks in New York, Chicago, Pittsburgh, Los Angeles, Dallas, and

Atlanta. They include the Bank of America, Bank of California, Bankers Trust Co., Chase Manhattan Bank, Chemical Bank of New York, Citizens and Southern Bank of Dallas, Continental Illinois Bank, National Bank and Trust of Chicago, Citizens Bank of Georgia, First National Bank of Atlanta, First National Bank of Boston, First National Bank of Chicago, First National City Bank of New York, Fulton National Bank of Atlanta, Girardi Trust Co., Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., Pacific National Bank of Seattle, Philadelphia National Bank, Security Pacific National Bank, Trust Company of Georgia, United California Bank, and Wells Fargo Bank. In other words, Lockheed, with its capital stock of 600 million dollars and a portfolio of military contracts equivalent to 10 times this amount, is virtually owned and controlled by the largest banking monopolies.

A similar system for the control of the government military market by financial capital is characteristic of other military-industrial companies. General Dynamics, for example, belongs partly to the family of H. Crown (8 percent of the stock), but the controlling stock (20 percent) is owned by giant banks in Chicago, Pittsburgh, and New York. The rest of the common stock is owned by various groups of commercial, industrial, and banking capital and by foreign shareholders in the United States, Canada, and Western Europe.

Another military-industrial concern, United Technologies, which once belonged to prominent American billionaire and industrialist H. Hughes, is now completely controlled by two banking groups. The first is the "anonymous" Hughes Foundation (Bank of America and the well-known Merrill Lynch Fenner & Smith billion-dollar corporation in New York), which holds around 30 percent of the stock. The second is the banking group of the Morgan Guaranty Trust, Chase Manhattan Bank, and Manufacturers Hanover Trust, controlling around 25 percent of the stock. The rest of the stock in this military-industrial concern belongs to other groups of shareholders.

It is significant that the large military-industrial firms and joint-stock companies represent only the visible top story of the military-industrial business. There are also small and medium-sized firms, universities, and scientific centers operating for the military market as Pentagon suppliers. The owners of large military-industrial firms frequently include, in addition to banking, industrial, and commercial capital, individual shareholders and "non-profit corporations"—universities, various partnerships, cooperatives, and labor unions—organizations with available capital for diversified investments in stock of various types. It is quite natural that the Pentagon's main suppliers are controlled by the financial oligarchy and banking and industrial capital. After all, the military monopolies constitute the nucleus of the industrial giants: 47 of them were among the top 100 industrial firms in America in the 1970's, and this is where the vital interests of the financial capital owning and controlling the industrial and banking monopolies

and the military monopolies through the stock mechanism are closely interconnected.

The diversified structure of the military market also gave birth to another type of corporation—the simultaneous military contractor and "co-owner of the MIC." The Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) is one of the largest scientific centers and oldest private universities in the United States. In terms of its organizational structure it is a "non-profit corporation": MIT cannot distribute the income from its activity, including profits on capital stock, among its co-owners. By law, its administrative and financial affairs have to be managed by a special company—the MIT Corporation. It also manages its capital, equivalent to 800 million dollars. MIT is one of the Pentagon's contractors: For years it has been among the top 100 Pentagon suppliers. Besides this, 20 percent of the capital of the non-profit MIT corporation is stock in equally large military-industrial firms—Boeing, Lockheed, General Dynamics, Grumman, Raytheon, McDonnell Douglas, and United Technologies. The remaining 80 percent of its capital has been invested in traditional businesses—stock in banking, industrial, and trade firms and in New York and Boston utilities—for diversification purposes and as a guarantee against unstable market conditions.

Here is another example of this kind of diversification. The structure of Princeton University—an elite scientific center and a Pentagon, NASA, and Department of Energy contractor—corresponds fully to the earlier example. Princeton University, a private academic institution and leading research center, is managed by the Princeton Corporation. The university's capital is equivalent to 400 million dollars. The corporate board has invested 15 percent of it in the stock of the previously listed military-industrial firms—Ling-Temco-Vought, Grumman, McDonnell Douglas, Boeing, Lockheed, and General Dynamics. The rest (85 percent) is invested in banking and industrial monopolies and the service sphere in New York. These two universities are the Pentagon's main scientific contractors and the subcontractors of the previously mentioned military-industrial firms and collaborate with them on defense contracts.

This kind of relationship is also characteristic of many other universities and scientific centers in the United States. Most of the capital of these "non-profit corporations" is usually invested in traditional sectors—banking, trade, industry, or transportation.

Therefore, an analysis of the true character and nature of the military monopoly representing the basis of the "iron triangle" making up the MIC testifies to its indeterminate features. Furthermore, the largest elite universities as well as medium-sized and small firms have been on the list of the "top 100" Pentagon contractors more than once in the last three decades. Today such large companies as Thompson-Rameau-Wooldridge or American Bosch-Arma, which once operated as small firms in the military market, are now among the Pentagon's main contractors. These are far from isolated examples.

The Government and the Military Business: Unity and Its Limits

The United States has no career or nationalized military industry. The treasury's military orders are usually filled by private capital with its enterprises. Although apologists for the military business assert that the military-industrial firms are essentially nationalized enterprises (because their activities are supposedly regulated that strictly by the government), we can see that this is not the case at all. All of them belong in one way or another to private capital. It is this that gives military production a civilian or private nature in some cases. After all, civilian and military products are produced simultaneously on the same conveyor belt in the same shop. The government is merely the main customer for military products, and private capital is its supplier, even though these are supplies of an extraordinary product—weapons—to a bourgeois government. This is particularly important. Military-economic policy is a derivative of the general strategy of the American bourgeois government at the end of the 20th century. The arms race of the early 1980's and the "rearming of America" are not the result of the demands of the military-industrial business or a generous gift to this business at treasury expense, but the result of a strategic shift, the rightward shift of the U.S. ruling class in its foreign policy strategy. As long as the military-industrial business fills the special orders of the government, representing the combined interests of all groups of the bourgeoisie, the government will give this business active support, but the same government will put up the most vehement opposition and curb the egotistical interests of this business as soon as these interests conflict with the strategic vital interests of the U.S. ruling class. The move toward a freeze on military expenditures in the middle of the 1980's, the growing opposition to militarism and the arms race, and the crisis of the idea of the "Soviet military threat" were the result of many economic, social, military, political, and other factors. No matter how hard big business tries to stop this new historic tendency by mobilizing its colossal political machine, it has to deal with the growing opposition of the general public and, above all, of Congress.

The stock of military-industrial firms is sold in stock exchanges in the United States and abroad just as freely as the stock of other industrial, trade, or banking corporations. Profits are usually within reasonable limits and are sometimes subject to fluctuation as a result of market and political conditions within the country and, in particular, abroad. Otherwise, and this is easy to imagine, if this stock could guarantee higher dividends, it would be bought up by investors quickly. As we know, capital in the United States today is being converted primarily into the stock of industrial companies mastering new fields of scientific and technical progress, producing the latest materials, or exploiting new sources of raw materials. The military business is appealing for another reason: This is a stable market and is guaranteed against crisis by all of the strength of the federal budget. The stock in military-industrial corporations is usually held by various financial institutions. They are part of

the system of U.S. financial capital and buy this stock usually in an effort to diversify their own operations—i.e., to distribute their capital and invest it in other sectors of the economy. Although the military market is relatively stable and secure and although military expenditures accounted for 6-6.5 percent of the GNP at the end of the 1980's and the government is a reliable source of this spending, the monopolist bourgeoisie earns most of its profits from civilian production. After all, most of the growth in production today is in the sectors of high technology, personal consumption, equipment, and construction. This is the truth about the stereotype of the superprofits of the military business, although this certainly does not exclude the possibility of isolated cases of embezzlement and cases in which the government is defrauded by the Pentagon's corporate contractors.

Finally, there is no compulsory military service in the United States. The many attempts to institute compulsory service in peacetime have been actively opposed by various social strata. The reluctance to form a reserve army has deep roots going all the way back to the American Revolution of 1775-1783 and to the basic principles of bourgeois democracy declared at that time. It is based on the dislike of professional soldiers and distrust of the career military establishment, feelings which have been traditionally cultivated in the American society, combined with the invariable desire to reserve the "personal right" of self-defense and the right to always "keep a gun in the home."

As a result of this historical tendency, the U.S. military department, the Pentagon, has traditionally been headed not by a professional soldier, but by a civilian—a political appointee of the ruling party, because it is in line with the political tradition of the dominant class to resist the pressure of the "military wing" on the administration. It was no coincidence that the 1986 Goldwater-Nickles Act on Pentagon reform stipulated that one of its goals was stronger "civilian political control of the military establishment."

Political, social, and economic realities in the United States today testify that military production, military policy, militarism, and the arms race are not simply the result of the omnipotence or pressure of the "iron triangle" (or MIC). This is a clearly defined strategy of the most reactionary segment of the U.S. monopolist bourgeoisie. The militarization of the economy and the arms race are propelled by a multifaceted government-administrative and socioeconomic mechanism. Its integral elements are not only the government agencies or individual industrial corporations filling the treasury's orders, or their lobbies in Congress, but also and primarily part of big industrial and banking capital, medium-sized and small business, scientific centers and universities, numerous associations of specialists (consulting and law firms, etc.), and much of the working class.

Each year around two-fifths of all military expenditures on deliveries to the treasury are absorbed by small businesses employing up to 50 percent of the labor force

and creating up to 50 percent of the goods and services in the total GNP. From 10 to 12 percent of the military expenditures in the form of R & D contracts settle in the U.S. scientific community each year.

The scales of the militarization of the economy are attested to by the following data. The government market consumes around 93 percent of all of the different kinds of goods and services produced by the U.S. economy: Four-fifths are military shipments. Military expenditures exceed one-fourth of all federal budget expenditures each year. In 1987 they were equivalent to 6.3 percent of the GNP in current prices and reached a critical point. More than 120,000 contractors—large, medium-sized, and small companies in the processing industry—fill military orders for the treasury. The total number of companies in all branches of the economy engaged in these deliveries is 230,000-240,000, and 12-13 percent of them are private and government commercial or “non-profit” corporations—scientific centers, universities, law firms, and consulting firms. The total number of people working directly on military contracts in industry in 1986 exceeded 6.5 million—more than 6 percent of the gainfully employed population. Around two-thirds of all the people working on government contracts, representing 17-18 percent of the entire labor force, including the civil service and the armed forces, are involved directly or indirectly in military or related projects for the government. There are 424 branches in the processing industry (according to the U.S. standard industrial index), and 94 of them (22 percent), the core of scientific and technical progress, “work” directly for the military market. Shipments to the government account for 12-13 percent of the total production volume in these branches each year; military products account for more than 80 percent of these shipments.

The militarization of the economy and the arms race, which are now undermining the U.S. economy more than ever before, are accomplished through a complex economic and administrative mechanism. They are frequently supported, and this point must not be oversimplified, by various segments of the American bourgeoisie and by its political and professional institutions. The unique socioeconomic policy of the government also plays an important role here. It has the specific purpose of involving as many firms as possible and as much of the labor force as possible in work for the treasury.

The militarization of the economy and the government policy of “distributing” military contracts among different geographic regions have involved thousands of enterprises in military production and related branches in addition to the hundreds of large industrial corporations and military-technical firms. Therefore, the term “military-industrial complex” conceals the actual scales of the arms race and militarization of the economy by concealing the real forces controlling the process.

For American bourgeois propaganda, this multileveled “social infrastructure” of the military business is a

convenient platform for the arms race and the growth of military expenditures. In this case the MIC consists of only a dozen large military firms, it is inseparable from the economic structure, and it represents a “national entity,” while military deliveries to the treasury, according to the MIC’s apologists, are “vitally necessary” as a source of “public income” and a means of “sustaining employment.”

It must be said that the many years of propaganda in the bourgeois press about the “vital importance” of the military business and the need for military spending on the one hand, and about its indeterminate organizational and socioeconomic nature on the other, have served as the basis for part of the American society’s belief in the positive nature of the military business.

In general, the militarism of the end of the 20th century is an important feature of imperialism, reflecting its particularly aggressive nature, and the militarization of the economy is a characteristic part of American state-monopolist capitalism, one of the facets of the crisis of this system, and an important but far from essential condition for its historical development.

Incidentally, the criticism of the American MIC in the Soviet press has regrettably failed to achieve its purposes in several cases. It is sometimes biased, is strictly for “domestic consumption,” and serves as the point of departure for various speculations on the part of American bourgeois propaganda and the right wing linked with the military business. One of their traditional theses is the allegation that the Kremlin is trying to subvert the “foundations of the American economy” but that people in the USSR have no knowledge of the actual processes in this economy. Objections to any direct criticism of the MIC are voiced by its apologists and by certain institutions in the American society: some labor unions in the industries supporting “big government,” “big government contracts,” and a “big budget.” They are joined by some small businesses and part of the working class from other industries and by some segments of the scientific and technical intelligentsia.

In this context, the direct criticism of the MIC by Soviet propaganda is regarded by these strata, as it is served up to them in the bourgeois press, as the “direct undermining” of their “vital interests” and as a “crude” attempt to “link” the interests of private capital—the owners of military and industrial firms—with the “vital needs of various strata of the American society” working for the government. Whether we like it or not, this approach is likely to alienate us from the petty and middle strata, representing the non-monopolist segments in America—employees working for the government market.

This is why, in our opinion, the use of the term “military-industrial complex” in our ideological arsenal obscures the essence of this phenomenon by oversimplifying our knowledge of the United States on the scientific level and conceals the real socioeconomic processes occurring in state-monopolist capitalism in that country.

Instead of employing the Marxist-Leninist theory of state-monopolist capitalism in its present form at the end of the 20th century, we are stubbornly exploiting a term from bourgeois political science which obscures the growth of militarism and the militarization of the economy and conceals the political and economic institutions and forces controlling this process.

All of this offers solid proof that the time has come to consider a more thorough analysis of the politico-economic mechanism behind the militarism, the militarization of the economy, and the arms race of the 1980's in the United States. How can we invent a general formula providing a more distinct reflection of the essence and nature of the militarization of the economy and the arms race in that country, their connection with its foreign and domestic policy, and the strictly anti-Soviet purpose of this phenomenon? What could we take as the initial base for our theory and criticism and also for our foreign policy activity and propaganda? A return to the Leninist heritage might be particularly appropriate today.

We know that during the period of the imperialist war of 1914-1918, V.I. Lenin defined the militarism, militarization of the economy, and unrestrained arms race of the leading capitalist powers as "military-state monopolist capitalism."¹ In this connection, we feel that today, under the conditions of the peaceful competition by the two systems, instead of referring to the MIC—i.e., the alliance of military monopolists and the military-state upper echelons—as the main determinant of the aggressive nature of American imperialism, it would be more valid to seek a different approach. We should probably consider the fact that the new historical atmosphere of competition between the two systems, in which socialism and forces for peace and democracy are actively opposing militarism, the arms race, and the slide toward nuclear war, has been accompanied by a tendency to turn American imperialism into a striking force against socialism, backed up by a military-state machine and the most reactionary strata of the monopolist bourgeoisie and the financial oligarchy. This force has the long-range strategic goal of the politico-military and economic isolation of the USSR, a systematic arms race, and the militarization of the economy, so that it can "drive socialism to its knees" during the new phase of the technological revolution and the apparent advantages in military-economic and military-technical competition with the USSR.

In the final analysis, it is quite obvious that the main threat to peace and the epicenter of the arms race is not the "iron triangle" or the notorious MIC, but the most reactionary segments of U.S. monopolist capital.

Today, now that the CPSU, expressing the vital interests of socialism and of the entire progressive world public, is justifiably asking whether capitalism has a present and future without wars and militarism, there is apparently no unequivocal answer to this question. Capitalism has not changed its nature in the 20th century, but the

capitalist world has seen cases in which the economy has developed successfully on the road to peace and progress, without paying any tribute to the god of war. Militarism and the arms race can and must be opposed today by all forces for peace, progress, and socialism.

The CPSU is now arming the Soviet society with a reliable scientific instrument, the new political thinking. It is an integral part of perestroika. The new political thinking is based on the Marxist-Leninist method of perceiving the world as a complex, diverse, and contradictory place. "From today's vantage point, distinguished by the growing nuclear threat, the increasing severity of other global problems, and the stronger internationalization of all processes in the world—which is growing more and more integral and interdependent despite all of its contradictions—we have tried to gain a more thorough understanding of an idea first set forth in Marxism, the idea of the interconnection of the interests of the proletarian class and of all mankind. This has led us to the realization of the priority of general human values in our century. This is the core of the new political thinking," M.S. Gorbachev stressed at the 19th All-Union Party Conference.²

Total disarmament and the renunciation of the arms race are accessible today and are widely supported by progressive forces throughout the world. These forces also exist in the United States and are gaining stronger influence in various strata of society, even those working on military contracts but realizing the fatal consequences of this policy. This is a unique sign of the times. The new political thinking is even winning increasing support in the place where bourgeois propaganda spent decades on the stubborn cultivation of the specter of the "Soviet military threat," a specter whose reality is now more and more likely to be doubted by the American general public and even by those who invented it.

Footnotes

1. V.I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 34, p 191.

2. "Materials of the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference, 28 June-1 July 1988," Moscow, 1988, p 29.

Growth of Canadian 'New Nationalism' Viewed

18030010b Moscow SSHA: *EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA* in Russian No 4, Apr 89 (signed to press 17 Mar 89) pp 33-41

[Article by Valentina Sergeyevna Azhayeva, candidate of historical sciences and scientific associate at Institute of Scientific Information on Social Sciences, USSR Academy of Sciences, and Sergey Yulyevich Danilov, candidate of historical sciences and senior scientific associate at Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies: "Public Political Awareness: Fragmentation and Points of Convergence (Canadian Case Study)"]

[Text] In the capitalist world the 1970's and 1980's were a time when several common assumptions were modified, public opinion became more fragmented, and views began to diverge, vary, and conflict with one another. There were several reasons for this—the development of differences in professional and social groups and the influence of economic crises, political upheavals, and the general crisis of bourgeois ideology, all of which led to the replacement of a comparatively integral mass consciousness with a divided consciousness, sometimes distinguished by a far from balanced and logical set of values.

From the 1940's through the 1960's—i.e., during the period of protracted and relatively steady economic growth and rise in the standard of living of the majority of the population—the mass consciousness in Canada was marked by an obsession with material success, consumption, and scientific and technical progress. The interests of material or family well-being caused the overwhelming majority of Canadians to assign secondary importance to many other values, cultivated passive attitudes toward the erosion of the country's independence in its partnership with the United States, and nurtured feelings of national nihilism. In combination with Canada's traditional provincialism, a result of the country's position on the periphery of the capitalist world and its relatively weak human and production potential, they kept the majority of Canadians from developing an active and steady interest in foreign policy issues and international affairs, except during periods of acute international crises—the Suez, Caribbean, and other crises.

During these years, however, intra-class social ties and values, traditional morality, and community allegiance remained relatively strong. Most Canadians also had a strong attachment to the social milieu of their own class, to their parties, and to their labor unions (in the case of organized labor).

The economic growth and wage increases of the 1950's and 1960's did not, however, automatically solve all social problems. In fact, new problems arose and became particularly acute during the lengthy periods of economic trouble in the 1970's and 1980's: structural unemployment, stagflation, environmental pollution, and the alienation of the individual. The mass consciousness

began to wonder about the present and future existence of Canadian individuals or social groups, about Canada's future as an independent bourgeois state with its own interests and priorities, and about international development issues.

In addition to this, the increasing diversity of occupations, the appearance of new and previously unknown specialties, and heightened territorial and social mobility led to the fragmentation of the mass consciousness of classes and social strata along the lines of age, profession, gender, and place of residence. The individual's set of values became less dependent on his social class when class affiliations became less noticeable, were more likely to be mediated by other factors, and had less predictable implications.¹ These developments can be traced in an examination of several substrata and categories of the Canadian working class and intelligentsia.

Class Categories in the Consciousness of the Laboring Public

A sizable segment of the industrial proletariat in Canada takes action in defense of its immediate interests: better working conditions, higher wages, benefits, and participation in low-level decisionmaking. This kind of action is taken by the laborers constituting the militant nucleus of the Canadian labor unions—dockworkers and workers in the steel, chemical, automobile, and electrical equipment industries. The most active are blue- and white-collar workers whose social status declined when microelectronics and automation reduced the value of their skills. They are capable of vigorous protest and lengthy strikes, and this was demonstrated by the events of the late 1970's at enterprises of Chrysler of Canada and INCO and by the actions taken by Canadian automobile workers in the middle of the 1980's under the leadership of the head of their union, R. White.

Some highly skilled workers, especially homeowners (there is a high percentage of middle-aged and elderly people in this group) acquired ambitions distinguishing them from the rest of the proletariat. They are more impressed by tax cuts than by higher wages or benefits. Their set of values rarely includes the line of thinking and action connected with the idea of the class solidarity of the laboring public.

A slightly different line of behavior is displayed by the new labor aristocracy—highly skilled workers in new occupations, many of whom are young. They have a fairly good education and usually take an interest in the important social issues that were just recently of greater interest to the intelligentsia than to workers. The broad-mindedness of the members of this substratum and their more developed thinking are not, however, a guarantee of progressive views or of a firm belief in class solidarity.

The social image and the mass consciousness of the Canadian workers in the labor reserve have changed considerably in the last two decades. Today's unemployed are usually unskilled blue- or white-collar workers who do not belong to labor unions and who once worked

in a small or medium-sized firm in a region or industry experiencing a recession. Many are college or high school graduates with absolutely no work experience. Many do not stay unemployed for long (2-4 months), but it is almost a regular occurrence, recurring almost annually.²

In view of the state unemployment insurance in Canada and the assistance many young unemployed workers get from relatives, unemployment is more likely to inflict emotional damage than financial injury on Canadian workers. It keeps them from acquiring a real profession, improving their skills, and developing their own personal set of at least the elementary values stemming from membership in a class or a social stratum.

The existence of so many unemployed workers, including young ones, causes employed workers, especially middle-aged and elderly ones, to take an extremely negative view of them. Sometimes the economic situation causes acute conflicts between the interests of those who have jobs and those who do not. In the late 1970's and early 1980's, for example, the number of unemployed workers rose continuously, far from all of them were eligible for compensation, and the real wages of employed workers rose at that time because of the declining rate of inflation. For this reason, when public opinion polls were conducted at that time, the majority of employed workers did not support a policy encouraging economic growth, which would have increased employment, but were in favor of the continuation of the government's struggle against inflation, which held out the prospect of higher unemployment.³

In the capitalist society there have been and are definite conflicts between the prosperous and the needy strata of the laboring public and between the working class and the middle strata. These differences and conflicts are illustrated quite clearly in Canada. Progressive Canadian economist L. Panich observed: "Whereas a common class enemy sometimes united workers and farmers, differences in class experience divided them. The farmer's main concerns were prices, tariffs, and credit, and not wages, working conditions, and the control of the production process."⁴ Now these differences can also be seen between the working class and urban middle strata. Public opinion polls confirm the many differences in the priorities of workers and middle strata even when their incomes are equal: Employment is the main concern of the former, whereas the latter list taxes or inflation as the main problem. Questions about the need to insure the unemployed and to pay compensation for industrial accidents are answered in the affirmative by almost 70 percent of the workers and only 45 percent of the members of middle strata. In discussions of the social influence of labor unions or of attitudes toward strikes, most of the members of middle strata share the negative opinions of the grand bourgeoisie and are thereby following in the wake of its ideological influence.⁵

It is significant that more than half of the Canadians surveyed in sociological polls identify themselves as members of the middle strata and only one-third say that

they belong to the working class.⁶ This is a constant tendency, regardless of the type of interview—both in procedures based on the respondent's immediate and first response and in surveys based on lengthy conversations with respondents and employing additional leading questions.⁷

A unique fragmented consciousness is taking shape in the youngest members of the laboring public. In essence, it reveals the disappearance of some of the values once characteristic of the working class. The mass media, music, and the latest styles promote stereotypical thinking and behavior far removed from the class approach to various events. Characteristic features of the earlier generations of working youth—proletarian education in the home and contacts on the job and in the neighborhood—are growing weaker. The tendency to surmount working-class origins and to change social status is particularly strong among youth. Young people have less interest in membership in labor unions and in the parties traditionally supported by the working class—the New Democratic, Liberal, and Communist parties. It is probable that each successive generation will be more likely than before to diminish the ranks of the Canadian working class.

Sociological studies indicate that the priority of either material or spiritual values in the general outlook of various groups of Canadians leads to different attitudes toward many economic problems and, in particular, the importance of economic growth for national development. Workers in traditional branches of the economy with the traditional set of values still regard economic growth as the basis of their well-being. Highly skilled workers in the newest branches of the economy and engineering and technical personnel have a broader view of the prospects for overall development and attach more importance to the defense of peace, the renunciation of nuclear weapons, and the protection of the environment. Another of this group's priorities is the development of the creative side of the work process, which could widen the boundaries of excessively narrow specialization and mechanical performance.

In the 1980's many Canadians have recognized the struggle for peace and action in defense of national independence as separate social values. Despite the mass nature of the Canadian peace movement of the 1980's,⁸ however, it has rarely been joined by blue- and white-collar workers from the military industry whose financial well-being depends on the production of arms. The overwhelming majority of Canadians support the principle of national independence in theory, but far from all of them are willing to make any kind of sacrifices for it. There are also differences in attitudes toward one of the most vital issues of our time—the need to protect the environment. Whereas broad segments of the intelligentsia take an active part in the ecological movement, most of the people employed in industry, especially at enterprises where the installation of purifying equipment would shut down operations for a long time, are not involved in the movement.

Many of the different aspects of the mass consciousness of the laboring public create points of divergence and points of convergence. Practical considerations and a pragmatic concern about immediate advantages and disadvantages are strong features of the Canadian mass consciousness. Support for a particular organization or party depends on its socioeconomic program. The data of sociological studies indicate that although election campaigns concentrate on a succession of various issues, including political, military, and moral questions, economic concerns still prevail. More than 75 percent of all Canadians name economic problems as their main concern.⁹

The data of a survey conducted just before the referendum in Quebec decided the question of the preservation of Canada's unity are indicative: Only 10 percent of the respondents called national unity the main concern, while 70 percent felt that economic problems were the main issue.¹⁰

Attitudes toward the agreement on free trade with the United States attest to the pragmatic approach of the Canadians. Public opinion polls indicated that the majority supported it in the hope of immediate advantages (the lower prices of some goods) and disregarded the warnings of the Communist Party, the labor unions, and the Social Democrats about the negative implications of this decision for Canada's economic independence. In spring 1988, 50 percent of the respondents approved of the agreement and only around 30 percent objected to it.

The fragmented and contradictory nature of the mass consciousness of the laboring public is also reflected in extremely ambiguous and unexpected attitudes toward various aspects of life. The workers' willingness to conform to the capitalist way of life and their unwillingness or outright refusal to supplement economic actions with ideological and political struggle have not always testified to a general reluctance or inability to take action in defense of acknowledged immediate interests. It is frequently the same people who supported compromises and concessions to business at times of economic crisis that take part in movements for the equality of women, the native population of the country, and the French-Canadians, in defense of nature, against the military threat, for expanded social insurance, and others.

The more pronounced professional and group differences in the Canadian working class in recent decades have introduced many changes into its image and consciousness. One fundamental fact, however, has not changed: All groups of hired laborers occupy a subordinate position in the work process. This is a key factor, despite the definite enhancement of the material well-being of the laboring public, and it constitutes the basis for a more radical mass consciousness and more radical action in defense of workers' rights.

The Development of Common Canadian Spiritual Values

The formation of the mass consciousness is influenced not only by the social status and political affiliations of each particular group of the population but also by the historical, national, and regional features that take shape over many decades in a country's development.

Canada was the victim of aggression from the south twice in the 18th and 19th centuries, and this naturally left an impression on the Canadian public's attitudes toward war and toward the southern neighbor. Canada took part in several military actions outside North America,¹¹ but until the 1920's it did this because it was part of the British Empire, even though participation in these wars was not in Canada's own interest.

The attitude toward war, chauvinistic fervor, and militaristic triumphs in general has been negative.¹² These feelings are quite strong in the working class and in the middle strata, particularly among French-Canadians. French-speaking Quebec is the largest regional seat of pacifism and isolationism in North America.¹³

It is significant, however, that the pacifism and isolationism of the Canadians have not evolved into consistent anti-militarism because they are combined in the mass consciousness with stereotypes common in the capitalist world with regard to "Atlantic solidarity" and "collective Western defense," evincing the ideological influence of the United States and Great Britain on Canada and the outdated and tenacious anti-Soviet prejudices characteristic of North America. These factors played a definite role in Canada's involvement in the military NATO bloc and in NORAD, which many Canadians regard as an "instrument of peace."

Nevertheless, there is no question that pacifism plays a positive role in the mass political consciousness and behavior of Canadians by keeping militarist feelings from taking root.

The colonial history of the Canadian society and its limited human and material potential (until the beginning of the 20th century) also had certain aspects, however, with a negative effect on the Canadians' general outlook.

For several centuries the Canadian public was not as autonomous and independent as the public in the overwhelming majority of capitalist countries. It was constantly aware of its dependence on external factors beyond its control, and not only in the economy but also in social life, including the spiritual life of which the mass political consciousness is one component.

Because the country did not have the strength for revolutionary liberation from the colonial regime, Canada's achievement of independence was seriously delayed: It had no internal self-government until the middle of the last century and no autonomy in foreign and military policy until the end of the 1920's. Furthermore, the

balance of power in the capitalist world was such that the reduction of Great Britain's power over Canada was accompanied by the growth of U.S. influence; Canada's official dependence on its overseas mother country, which was gradually growing weaker, was slowly and almost imperceptibly replaced by actual dependence on its dynamic southern neighbor, which became the leader of the capitalist world. During this process, Canada was attached to both of its partners in the "Atlantic triangle" not only by the bonds of economic and political dependence but also by common features of spiritual life—language, culture, and religion. This, especially in the sphere of Canadian-American relations, concealed Canada's dependence and prevented many Canadians from realizing what was happening. This distorted the Canadians' view of such matters as state interests, nominal and real sovereignty, and the country's place in the international community.

Regionalism is another factor influencing the attitudes of the public perceptibly. The development of the Canadian economy in clusters, the presence of a rapidly developing neighbor—the United States, and the ethnic and religious diversity of the population combined with its small size and relatively low level of density have given many Canadians a provincial or regional outlook rather than a national one. This is the situation in the majority of Canadian provinces, with the exception of the key province of Ontario. According to public surveys, even in the 1980's around 30 percent of the country's inhabitants identified themselves first as Quebecois, Albertans, Newfoundlanders, and so forth, and only second as Canadians.¹⁴ During conflicts between federal and provincial authorities, this segment of the population openly defends the region against all others and against the country as a whole.

The situation in which the individual associates himself with the region (or province) in which he lives instead of with his country is particularly characteristic of Quebec, where ethnic values have merged with provincial values in the mass consciousness of the French-speaking population. When a survey was taken to find out whether French-Canadians should preserve their own way of life or be closer to other Canadians, more than half of the French-Canadian respondents wanted to preserve their unique culture. Around 30 percent of the French-Canadians felt that the preservation of their language and culture was more important than a higher standard of living, although a majority (42 percent) would prefer to have both.¹⁵

The regionalist outlook is present in several countries, primarily bourgeois federations, but in most of them it is tempered by great-power attitudes (the United States and the FRG), a common heritage of national liberation struggle (Spain and Mexico), or limited territorial parameters (Switzerland and Belgium). Canada, where these factors are virtually absent, is one of the world's leaders in the regionalization of the mass consciousness. Regionalism is both a result of the weak Canadian

national identity and a factor preventing its total development. It also impedes the development of the common class values of the working class because it can disunite the laboring public along regional lines.

As for the national identity and patriotism that constitute an essential prerequisite for the existence of any independent state, their development in Canada represented an exceptionally difficult and arduous journey.

Their establishment was delayed by the lack of experience in victorious bourgeois revolution, the extreme shortage of commonly acknowledged national heroes, and the general provincial attitudes of the Canadians scattered throughout the vast territory of Canada, which could not promote strong public interest in the massive problems facing the country and in its development priorities. Until the second half of the 20th century the patriotic feelings of Canadians were vague and indeterminate and had only a tenuous connection with the needs and objectives of state development in the public mind.

One of the characteristic features of the Canadian mass consciousness which became part of the Canadians' flesh and blood was the underestimation of their own strength and potential and a conservative or pessimistic assessment of their country's role and place in relations with the United States and in the international community. Whole generations of Canadians lived with the belief that Canada was incapable of generating the capital, technology, and culture needed for total social development and that it was an insignificant entity. The overt expression of national pride characteristic of the majority of capitalist powers, where it frequently turns into national arrogance, was uncommon in Canada. There was the unspoken assumption that affiliation with Canada was no cause for pride. National pride and patriotism were regarded as somewhat reprehensible—i.e., they were equated with conceit and national narrow-mindedness.

It is not surprising that the Canadians grew accustomed to seeing the problem of national autonomy and uniqueness in a different way from the inhabitants of the West European states, the United States, and Japan. Some of them simply did not believe in the existence of this problem. Others applauded the institution of national sovereignty in relations with the mother country but reconciled themselves to the influx of American capital and the invasion of the Americanized mass culture. Whereas similar processes usually worried much of the public in many other countries, the majority of Canadians saw them merely as the completely understandable effects of free competition in the bourgeois democratic society. There was the assumption that American capital should not be blamed for the Canadians' own authorization of its establishment in their country. As many Canadians asked: "Why should we blame foreigners for our own mistakes?"¹⁶

These attitudes, which could have played a positive role in a society infected by great-power chauvinism, prevented the development of a national identity in Canada. One of the main reasons was the "colonial mentality" of the Canadians, who had grown used to dependence on foreign powers. The influence of the bourgeois cosmopolitan and technocratic ideas about the disappearance of state borders and national distinctions in today's world was another reason. Finally, the philosophy of social Darwinism, teaching that the weak were doomed to fall prey to the strong, was quite popular in North America.

The situation in which the Canadian mass consciousness had traditionally lagged behind the level of the country's general development began to change in the last two decades with the upsurge of patriotic feelings known as the "new nationalism." During that time the Canadians seemed to be making up for lost time in acknowledging the problems of national autonomy and independence. Canada's stronger economic potential and heightened prestige abroad, the vital need for massive actions in support of national autonomy, and the opportunities afforded for foreign policy action in the years of detente were all analyzed during unofficial but extensive and thorough debates in the news media, labor unions, the academic and business communities, and public organizations.

"The changes occurring in our country allowed us to see ourselves through our own eyes instead of through an English or American looking-glass. We are no longer immigrants and poor orphans.... We are finally beginning to realize who we are and where we are going,"¹⁷ journalist H. Robertson wrote in reference to the importance of these debates in developing the Canadian identity.

The "new nationalism" had a long-term effect on the political awareness and behavior of Canadians by updating and supplementing part of their set of values. There is no question that the Canadians are more concerned about the future of the country in its partnership with the United States. They are less likely to feel inferior when they compare their society to the American and English societies. Furthermore, this might be the first time in the history of Canada that many of its inhabitants have openly expressed pride in their Canadian nationality. Sociological surveys of the early 1980's recorded a high level of national identity and patriotism, and in relation to the country as a whole rather than to specific provinces.¹⁸ Statements such as "I am proud of Canada. My country has much to offer," can be encountered much more frequently than before in the mass media and in public opinion polls.

In these years the Canadians' sense of patriotism matured, was associated more closely with the vital needs of the country, and acquired a relatively distinct and complete form. The number of Canadians supporting special measures in defense of Canadian property, including government property, and national

autonomy rose dramatically, whereas just 15-20 years earlier the majority of Canadians had regarded these measures as superfluous or unnatural.¹⁹ Petro-Canada, the government-owned oil firm, began to enjoy particularly steady public backing. It was established in response to the rapacious activity of foreign TNC's, and in the 1980's it became a tangible symbol of Canadian independence in the public mind.

It is interesting that during the serious internal crises in the Canadian federation—the terrorist acts in Quebec in 1970 and the referendum on the future of that province in 1980—the majority of the population, with the exception of the rather small group of supporters of separatist and extreme regionalist views, expressed approval of the idea of preserving Canada as a single autonomous state.

The fact that the reinforcement of the Canadian national identity coincided with the failure of U.S. aggression in Indochina strengthened pacifism as part of the general outlook of most Canadians, especially those in agreement with the "new nationalism." The process by which pacifism merged with Canadian nationalism was made stronger by the Canadians' negative reaction to U.S. interventionist operations in Central America and Lebanon and to the Reagan administration's "Strategic Defense Initiative."

The establishment of the ideological and political reference points of Canadian patriotism and its propagation in the society are important to Canada's existence as an autonomous power and to the future of the laborers fighting for their own interests—the working class and the democratic segment of the middle strata. In combination with the movement against the danger of nuclear war, the struggle in defense of national independence will constitute a broad basis for concerted action by progressive forces in the country in other important fields of social development.

The ideological and political foundations of capitalism are so solid in North America that the critical opposition views of part of the working class and the middle strata are rarely translated in their mass consciousness into a complete and constant anti-capitalist outlook. Most of the Canadian laboring public is fighting only for specific reforms within the capitalist system. Of course, this does not mean that all of the reforms they propose are necessarily restricted or secondary by their very nature or that they are of some significance only to Canada or its different regions. The struggle against the arbitrary and antisocial behavior of the TNC's is an essential condition for the maturation and dissemination of the anti-capitalist ideology and the future unification of most of the laboring public around the forces striving for radical change in the society. The Canadian laboring public's actions against the threat of war and for the protection and conservation of natural resources are part of the general democratic movement of the international public.

Footnotes

1. AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 1987, vol 81, No 4, p 1298.
2. B. Eastman, "Labour Market Theory and the Canadian Experience," Toronto, 1987, p 244.
3. EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL RESEARCH, 1985, No 3, p 41.
4. MONTHLY REVIEW, 1985, No 11, p 7.
5. CANADIAN REVIEW OF SOCIOLOGY AND ANTHROPOLOGY, 1985, No 3, p 380.
6. The actual figures, according to Canadian statistics, would be approximately one-third and two-thirds respectively.
7. CANADIAN REVIEW OF SOCIOLOGY AND ANTHROPOLOGY, 1987, No 2, p 276.
8. In the middle of the 1980's, 85 percent of the Canadians surveyed supported a nuclear freeze (THE GAZETTE, 24 August 1984).
9. EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL RESEARCH, 1985, No 3, p 242.
10. CANADIAN REVIEW OF SOCIOLOGY AND ANTHROPOLOGY, 1987, No 2, p 274.
11. Including England's colonial wars in Africa and World Wars I and II.
12. H. Clarke et al, "Absent Mandate. The Politics of Discontent in Canada," Toronto, 1984, p 81.
13. After experiencing colonial oppression and then effective inequality, the French-Canadians always regarded any wars in which Canada had to take part as an Anglo-Canadian affair completely alien to the interests of Quebec.
14. R. Gibbins, "Regionalism. Territorial Politics in Canada and the United States," Scarborough (Ontario), 1982, pp 77, 158.
15. The Anglo-Canadian population of Quebec has somewhat different attitudes: Only 9 percent assign the highest priority to the preservation of language and culture, 48 percent prefer a higher standard of living, and 38 percent agree that both are needed.
16. D. Morton, "NDP. Social Democracy in Canada," Toronto, 1986, p 76.
17. MACLEAN'S MAGAZINE, 8 April 1985, p 21.
18. "Political Support in Canada: The Crisis Years," edited by A. Kornberg and H. Clarke, Durham (N.C.), 1983, pp 85-89.
19. R. Johnston, "Public Opinion and Public Policy in Canada: Questions of Confidence," Toronto, 1986, pp 98, 175; CANADIAN LABOUR, December 1986, p 5.

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Korniyenko on 'Mistakes' in Decision To Deploy SS-20's

52000045 Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 89 pp 42-52

[Article by Georgiy Markovich Korniyenko, USSR first deputy minister of foreign affairs from 1977 to 1986: "The Truth and the Lies About the SS-20 Missile;" passages in boldface as published]

[Text] The Soviet intermediate-range missiles known as the SS-20's in the West (our designation of RSD-10 never did catch on) are still the subject of the intense debates in the Soviet press which began just before the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles was signed. Although the issue in question has a variety of facets, the debates ultimately boil down to the question of whether it was worthwhile for the Soviet Union to develop and deploy these missiles in view of the fact that it agreed to eliminate all of them a short time later.

The people who prefer simple answers and do not want to trouble themselves with lengthy contemplation are quick to draw the categorical conclusion that the intermediate-range missiles "were completely unnecessary, as the treaty on the elimination of all these missiles proved."¹ Simple answers might seem convincing on the surface at times, but they are not always the best answers to complicated questions, and this is certainly one of these.

In my opinion, a substantial contribution to the elucidation of the SS-20 issue was made by four articles printed in the journal: the articles by G.M. Sturua, A.Ye. Bovin, L.S. Semeyko, and S.A. Karaganov which were united by a common theme—"Was It a Mistake To Deploy the SS-20 Missiles?"²

The authors arrived at different and inconclusive answers to this question, but it seems to me that the documented information and detailed analyses in these articles can bring us closer to the right answer.

Because I had to deal with the issue of intermediate-range missiles during various stages in their development and from various standpoints as part of my official duties, I would like to do my part in the search for the right answer.

Finding this answer seems important not only because it will set the record straight but also because it can teach us useful lessons for the future.

At the Root of the Problem

The issue of the SS-20 missiles cannot be clarified properly without a brief review of the issue of all intermediate-range missiles in their historical context

and in connection with the other factors determining the strategic situation during the period of time in question.

First of all, by whom and when were nuclear weapons first deployed in Europe, including those which were later put in the intermediate-range category? The facts indicate the following.

This happened back in 1948, when the United States deployed more than 90 B-29 medium-range bombers in Great Britain, some of which had atomic bombs on board. And this was done in spite of and in addition to the fact that the United States had heavy B-52 bombers on its own territory that were equipped with atomic bombs and were capable of reaching the territory of the USSR while the Soviet Union had no nuclear weapons at all at that time.

Later, between 1954 and 1958, the United States deployed Matador, Thor, and Jupiter missiles and Mace robot bombs in West Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and Turkey that were capable of delivering nuclear strikes within the territory of the Soviet Union and the East European socialist countries. This was also done at a time when the United States was indisputably superior in intercontinental nuclear weapon delivery vehicles.

Besides this, Great Britain, the United States' chief ally in the North Atlantic alliance, acquired its own nuclear weapons in 1952, and France acquired them a short time later, in 1961.

Under these conditions, could the Soviet Union not have taken countermeasures for at least the partial neutralization of the nuclear threat posed by NATO? Those who believe today that we could have gotten along without intermediate-range missiles altogether, in view of the fact that they are now being destroyed anyway, should give this question some thought.

The countermeasures included the deployment of intermediate-range missiles in the European part of the USSR: the SS-4 missiles (as they are known in the West) began to be deployed in 1959—i.e., when an entire series of nuclear systems aimed at the Soviet Union and its allies had been deployed in the West European NATO countries for more than 10 years; the SS-5 missiles began to be deployed in 1961.

It is common knowledge that the attempt to deploy a certain quantity of these Soviet missiles in Cuba in 1962 ended with the need to bring them back to the Soviet Union. One of the results of the Soviet-American agreement of 1962, which put an end to the Caribbean crisis—in addition to the chief U.S. commitment not to invade Cuba—was the removal of American intermediate-range missiles from Turkey and Italy at the beginning of 1963. In spite of the official American statements that this action was not connected in any way with the Soviet-American agreement of 1962, I, as one of the

people directly involved in the negotiation of this agreement, have reason to believe that this connection, however unofficial and confidential it might have been, did exist.

I mention this because we have to consider another question: When the Americans removed their old intermediate-range missiles from Europe (in 1962 and 1963), why did we not get rid of our own missiles of this category at the same time?

To shed some light on this question, we must remember the overall strategic situation at that time. By the end of 1962 the United States had 294 ICBM's and the USSR had 75; the respective figures for SLBM's were 160 and just a few units, and those for heavy bombers were over 600 and 190. The United States also kept a broad range of other (in addition to these missiles) forward-based nuclear systems in Western Europe. Besides this, there were the growing nuclear arsenals of Great Britain and France.

Therefore, at the time of the Caribbean crisis the position of the United States and of NATO as a whole was not one of mere superiority, but one of absolutely obvious supremacy in nuclear weapons. I do not have the slightest doubt that the United States consented (as an unofficial element of the agreement) to remove its old intermediate-range missiles from Europe only because it could afford to do this without risking any noticeable erosion of the North Atlantic alliance's strategic position in Europe. The elimination of our intermediate-range missiles at that time, on the other hand, would have weakened the USSR's already weak position as far as nuclear forces were concerned. This was the pre-history of the SS-20 issue.

Could These Missiles Never Have Been Deployed?

Again we must start by remembering what was happening in the world in the decade and a half between the Caribbean crisis and the deployment of the SS-20 missiles.

The intensive buildup of strategic offensive arms was accompanied by the multiplication and improvement of American forward-based nuclear systems in Europe. By the end of the 1960's it was common knowledge that the United States was working on new intermediate-range missiles, the prototypes of the future Pershing II and Tomahawk missiles. The nuclear arsenals of Great Britain and France underwent substantial growth at the same time.

From the very beginning of the Soviet-American strategic arms limitation talks (SALT I) in 1969, and then at the SALT II negotiations, the Soviet side brought up the question of the American forward-based nuclear systems because their geographic position allowed for the delivery of strikes against the USSR. We also spoke of the need to consider the potential threat posed to the Soviet Union by third countries with nuclear weapons. These issues were the topic of heated debates, especially

during the Soviet-American meeting in Vladivostok in 1974, but each time the United States stubbornly refused to include them in the negotiations.

Under these conditions, it is understandable that the Soviet Union also tried to build up its nuclear arsenal, especially strategic arms, although with perceptible delays in most areas. Nevertheless, running ahead a few years in my story, I must say that when the deployment of the SS-20 missiles began in 1976, the correlation of nuclear weapons on strategic carriers was 2.5:1 in the United States' favor.

As for the Soviet SS-4 and SS-5 missiles, there were 600 of them before the SS-20 missiles began to be deployed.³ These were liquid-propellant missiles of the first generation and they were already technically obsolete by the middle of the 1970's. They stopped being produced back in 1962 (SS-4) and 1965 (SS-5). As time went by, they became increasingly unreliable and even unsafe.

Is it possible for anyone who retains a realistic view of the situation and of all the objective circumstances of the period of time when the "cold war" was going on, dying down at times and then flaring up again, to believe that the Soviet Union would not think about replacing the old intermediate-range missiles with new and, of course, technically improved ones?

Quite frankly, I was amazed when USSR Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs A.A. Bessmertnykh expressed doubts about the accuracy of the decision once made to deploy the SS-20 missiles in the USSR when he was interviewed by NOVOYE VREMYA, saying that "we had enough SS-4 and SS-5 missiles in Europe."⁴

This statement seems illogical and unconvincing if for no other reason than because the SS-20's were being developed and deployed not in addition to the SS-4's and SS-5's but for their replacement, and this was not a matter of expediency or in expediency, but a matter of necessity, or even of inevitability. In other words, in this case it is simply wrong to say whether there were or were not enough of the earlier missiles. We can assume that the discussions of that time dealt with whether the Soviet Union should or should not have intermediate-range missiles at all now that the SS-4 and SS-5 missiles were obsolete.

In this connection, I cannot agree with A.Ye. Bovin either when he says that "this was clearly a case in which military-technical logic outweighed all other considerations: After a new weapon has been 'invented,' it has to be developed and embodied in iron, and after it has been developed, it has to be deployed and positioned for combat." I think something like this might have happened in our country, but in other cases. It is an oversimplification to say that this is what happened, and "clearly" at that, in the case of the SS-20 missiles. The facts testify that they were "invented" because they had to be developed, and not that they were developed because they had been "invented."

In any case, judging by all the facts available to me (and by now they are available to virtually anyone, and many were cited in the articles printed in this journal), I personally believe that the decision to develop and begin deploying the SS-20's was **unavoidable**, and therefore there is no reason to regard the decision in itself as a mistake.

At the same time, I believe just as firmly (and I always did) that serious mistakes were made when this decision was being carried out, and that these mistakes had equally serious consequences.

What Was the Main Mistake?

To elucidate the essence of what I regard as the main mistake committed during the deployment of the SS-20 missiles, we must remember the events that occurred between the time when they began to be deployed in 1976 and the time when the NATO Council decided in December 1979 to deploy new American intermediate-range missiles in Europe. The fact that the Soviet-American strategic arms limitation talks were progressing, although with great difficulty, to the point of the conclusion of a new treaty (SALT II) evoked ambivalent feelings in ruling circles in the West European NATO countries. On the one hand, the improvement of Soviet-American relations in the central, strategic area was applauded in principle, but on the other there was the fear that this might create a "rift" between the United States and Western Europe. This is why some people wanted to strengthen the United States' nuclear attachment to Europe by means of the deployment of additional American nuclear weapons of new classes here. This was not an easy decision for West European leaders to make—particularly in the case of ground-launched nuclear weapons—because of mounting anti-nuclear feelings in their countries.

There was no unanimity in U.S. ruling circles either on the military expediency of deploying new American intermediate-range missiles in Europe. In particular, we know that the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff saw no need for this; the military establishment would rather have modernized the Pershing I operational-tactical missile. Among others, former national security advisers M. Bundy and H. Kissinger also expressed doubts. Even an official with such militaristic views as R. Perle saw no military need to deploy Pershing II and intermediate-range cruise missiles in Europe and later said that the decision to deploy them had caused much more political harm to NATO than they were worth.⁵

It is also important to remember that, despite the beliefs which took shape later, in 1977-1979 even the people in the West who immediately began using the SS-20's as a bogey and started insisting on "the nuclear up-arming" of NATO did not dare to say (and they had no reason to do so) that the number deployed at that time had changed the balance of power in this area in favor of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact countries. I would also like to point out something else that is also contrary to

popular opinion—that this was not implied in the NATO Council decision of December 1979 or in the statements made by the leaders of the countries of this bloc in connection with this decision. The decision simply said that the deployment of the SS-20's, combined with other Soviet steps to modernize nuclear arms in Europe, had given rise to tendencies disturbing the North Atlantic alliance, "because if these tendencies should continue (emphasis mine—G.K.), the superiority of the Russians in tactical nuclear weapons could undermine the stability achieved in intercontinental systems and arouse doubts about the reliability of the strategy of deterrence employed by NATO."⁶ Statements made by several leaders of NATO countries at the time when this decision was made clarified that a real change in the balance of power in favor of the USSR might occur by the middle of the 1980's if these tendencies should continue.

In connection with this, I must once again disagree with A.Ye. Bovin, who provides this interpretation of NATO's assessment of the situation resulting from the replacement of the old SS-4 and SS-5 missiles with the more advanced SS-20 missiles: "Consequently, the balance had been disrupted and NATO would have to restore it—if the USSR did not remove the new missiles—by deploying American intermediate-range missiles in Western Europe. This was the purpose of the 'dual-track decision' in 1979." The inaccuracy of this description of the purpose of the NATO Council's December decision is confirmed by just one reading of this decision and the accompanying statements by leaders of NATO countries. Incidentally, when H. Schmidt, who is regarded as one of the "fathers" of the decision, was asked in February 1981, more than a year after the December decision had been made, whether the "balance between West and East in Europe" had already been disrupted, he answered that it had not, adding that "the Russians could disrupt it at any time."⁷

I will return again to the real state of affairs and the real purpose of the December 1979 NATO decision, but for now I would just like to stress that at the time the decision was made, and certainly during the preceding period, the leaders of the NATO countries were not asserting that the deployment of the SS-20 missiles was already shifting the balance in the USSR's favor and that it had to be "restored"; they were simply saying that it was time to take steps to prevent the disruption of the balance in the future.

I am discussing this matter at length only because it is of the greatest importance in understanding the main thought I want to share with you now.

In my opinion, it was precisely the existence of the three previously mentioned circumstances in 1977-1979—the ambivalent feelings of West European NATO leaders about the prospect of the deployment of new American missiles in Europe; the absence of unanimity within the U.S. leadership on this issue; and the generally noncommittal nature of public assessments by U.S. and West

European leaders of the nature and speed of changes in the balance of power in Europe—it was all of this combined that created a "window of possibility" for a political compromise that might have prevented the deployment of American intermediate-range missiles in Western Europe.

Furthermore, the possible outlines of this compromise could be discerned. It was suggested to us that if we "revealed our cards," indicating that the number of SS-20 missiles to be deployed would not be any higher (in terms of warheads) than the number of SS-4 and SS-5 missiles, or, better yet, if we were to limit ourselves to a slightly lower number with a view to their higher qualitative indicators, this would alleviate the worries of West Europeans, and the plans for the deployment of new American missiles in Europe would be abandoned. This was essentially what we were told by then Chancellor of the FRG H. Schmidt when he made a special brief stopover in Moscow on his way from Bonn to Tokyo in summer 1979.

This was, in my opinion, a real opportunity, and our failure to make use of it was a mistake. I am saying this not only from the standpoint of our thinking today; even then some of us were in favor of giving Schmidt's remarks serious consideration, striking up a dialogue, and finding a compromise. Of course, this would have necessitated the adjustment of our plans for a slight reduction in the number of SS-20's to be deployed, and this would have been within reasonable and realistic limits.

Unfortunately, however, the prevailing opinion of that time seemed to be the following: "Just look at what they want now: We have to reveal our plans to them and even modify them! And who will guarantee that they will give up their own plans afterward?"

Obviously, no one could guarantee this, and we could not be completely certain that we would reach a mutually acceptable compromise, but there was virtually no risk involved either. If no agreement had been reached, our position and the position of anti-nuclear forces in Western Europe would have been politically much stronger, and it would have been much more difficult to make and carry out the NATO decision on the deployment of American missiles in Europe.

I agree with those who see mistakes in some of our subsequent actions, such as the initial refusal to begin negotiations "until the NATO decision has been countermanded," then "until its implementation has been halted," and then by "slamming the door" on negotiations. This was unreasonable even by traditional standards. At that time we not only had people with dissident views, but also people who expressed these views loudly, and no one listened to them.

It seems to me, however, that our most serious error, our chief mistake, was our failure to make use of the opportunity to reach a mutually acceptable compromise even before the NATO decision to deploy new American

intermediate-range missiles in Europe was made. I think this could be called a classic example of what M.S. Gorbachev was talking about in his speech at the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference when he said that we did not always make use of new political opportunities to safeguard the security of the state and to alleviate friction and strengthen mutual understanding between nations.⁸

We lost our chance. Our lack of a positive response to Schmidt's suggestions gave the go-ahead to the decision to deploy American Pershing II intermediate-range missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles in Europe. After the completion of political preparations, carefully planned this time with a view to the failure of the earlier plans for the deployment of American neutron weapons in Europe, the decision was made by the NATO Council on 12 December 1979.

What Was the Real Purpose of the NATO Decision?

We must return to this question to learn exactly what role the SS-20 missiles played in its adoption and to gain a more accurate understanding of the course and outcome of subsequent negotiations and, in the final analysis, a better understanding of the real significance of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles.

We must admit that NATO propaganda was quite successful in creating the impression that the purpose of the 1979 NATO decision was either to prevent the disruption of the balance of power in Europe or to restore the already disrupted balance. In time, this "detail" was deliberately obscured, but whereas it was definitely important at a specific time and in a specific context (which were discussed above), the most important thing here, of course, is something else: Did the deployment of the SS-20's really threaten to change the balance of power in Europe in favor of the USSR, or were NATO's decisions dictated by other considerations?

Conclusive evidence was already cited in the Western press, and then in the Soviet press (including the four previously mentioned articles), to prove that even if the deployment of the SS-20's played some kind of role, it was certainly not the decisive one. I will present additional corroboration.

When American General B. Rogers, then the supreme allied commander of NATO armed forces in Europe, was interviewed by DER STERN, he expressed satisfaction with NATO's new ability to deliver strikes against the Soviet Union's territory with missile systems from Western Europe and then went on to say: "We could always do this with planes, but when the English stopped building the Vulcan bombers and the American F-111 bomber was the only plane capable of reaching Soviet territory, we decided that modernization was in order, and **certainly not because the SS-20 had made its appearance**"⁹ (emphasis mine—G.K.).

It does not seem that he could have said this in plainer terms, and it is difficult to think of any reason Rogers would have had to tell a lie in this case, but even if we admit the possibility that he did evade the truth for some unknown reason in this public statement by pretending that the SS-20 had nothing to do with the decision, we can find the same kind of statement in documents not intended for publication. For example, THE OBSERVER, the respected English newspaper, reported on 16 October 1983 that it had come into possession of a set of secret U.S. State Department and Defense Department documents from 1978 and 1979 on the preparations for the NATO decision on the deployment of American missiles in Western Europe. The excerpts from these documents (their authenticity was never denied) in the newspaper clearly say the same thing that Rogers admitted publicly. Here is a frank statement from one of the documents: "In view of the current level of Soviet SS-4 and SS-5 missiles, the modernization of Soviet forces with the SS-20 missiles will not increase the threat to NATO to any significant extent."

If this is true, then what was the real purpose of the NATO decision on the deployment of American intermediate-range missiles in Europe? What was the aim?

I think that S.A. Karaganov came closest of all to the correct answer in his article. I am referring to his idea that the appearance of the SS-20 missiles and several other steps to modernize the USSR's nuclear arsenal were interpreted by ruling circles in NATO countries as something that might eliminate the advantages the bloc had enjoyed in this area up to that time.

In other words, this was not a threat of superiority on the part of the USSR, but of the loss of the advantages NATO still had (we liked to talk about parity at that time although it still did not exist—we were still "catching up"). This was the reason for the attempt to use the deployment of new American intermediate-range missiles in Western Europe for the preservation or augmentation of these NATO advantages.

There is also the testimony of a source as authoritative as then U.S. Secretary of Defense H. Brown. When he addressed a congressional committee in September 1979 to explain the purpose of the NATO decision to be made in 3 months on the missiles and on other NATO programs, he frankly admitted that "the Warsaw Pact will also continue improving its forces, but current trends indicate that if all the necessary funds are allocated for the NATO programs, this alliance should have a **clear military advantage** by the middle of the 1980's. The main reason to anticipate this advantage is the fact that the dual effort NATO plans for the modernization of armed forces and the quicker transfer of American reinforcements to Europe **will more than compensate** for the improvements envisaged by the Warsaw Pact, which are based only on modernization" (emphasis mine—G.K.).

When President F. Mitterand of France was interviewed by EPOCA magazine in May 1981, he also spoke frankly

about the real purpose of the deployment of American missiles in Europe: "The SS-20 missiles cannot cross the Atlantic; they threaten only Europe, and not the United States. The American Pershing missiles, on the other hand, are aimed at vitally important centers of the Soviet Union. It will take them less time to reach these centers than for Soviet missiles to reach the United States. The difference in time alone could disrupt the balance between the great powers."

Therefore, the real purpose of the NATO decision was not at all the restoration of the balance of power in Europe, which had supposedly shifted in the USSR's favor, and not even the prevention of this kind of shift in the future, but the preservation and even the augmentation of some of the advantages of the North Atlantic bloc.

In addition to clearly corroborating this main conclusion, the statements by Brown and Rogers are interesting in two other respects.

First of all, they prove that NATO does not, just as we do not, separate missiles from airborne nuclear weapon delivery systems when it plans their use, but views them as interchangeable and intersupplementary to some extent. This confirms the accuracy of our original insistence on the need for a comprehensive decision on all intermediate-range nuclear systems. And even if aviation was ultimately ignored in favor of a primary agreement on missiles, this does not mean that our initial position was "mistaken," as some people are inclined to say today. We simply made a concession, which was not of decisive importance in this case, for the sake of reaching an agreement.

Second, it is absolutely clear from their statements that the leaders of the United States and of NATO as a whole base their plans on the combined nuclear arsenal of the NATO countries, and not only of the United States. There are many other confirmations of this.

For example, the "White Paper" of the Government of Great Britain on defense for 1978 said that "British submarines carrying Polaris missiles are an integral part of NATO strategic systems." The document for 1979 again said that "British forces also constitute an integral part of the theater nuclear forces of vital importance in NATO's policy of deterrence." Furthermore, the "White Paper" for 1981—i.e., after the 1979 NATO decision—frankly admitted: "We maintain modern nuclear forces intended for use within the framework of NATO's strategy of flexible response and capable of inflicting so much damage on the Soviet Union that **the Soviet leaders must take them into account**" (emphasis mine—G.K.).

Although France is not included in the combined armed forces of NATO in peacetime, its nuclear weapons are taken into account in NATO military plans, and this is specifically referred to in the annual reports of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. This is understandable because, as a report prepared by the U.S. Congressional Research Service explained, France's NATO commitments are not

contingent upon its membership or non-membership in the NATO military organization (which, incidentally, was not established immediately after the treaty was signed). This is not denied, strictly speaking, by French leaders either. When President F. Mitterand visited the Ile Longue submarine base on 24 July 1981, he said: "This strong deterrent will make a contribution to the combined allied defense within the framework of an alliance to which we have remained loyal even if we must take charge of our own decisions."

It is also indicative that government documents of the FRG, a NATO ally of England and France, from 1979-1981 on NATO intermediate-range nuclear systems in Europe list, in addition to American F-111 bombers, the English Polaris SLBM's and Vulcan bombers and the French ground- and sea-launched ballistic missiles and Mirage-IV planes.

In any case, all of this proves that there is no reason to believe that we were mistaken in our prolonged insistence on the inclusion of the nuclear weapons of Great Britain and France in NATO forces in agreements on the reduction of Soviet and American intermediate-range nuclear systems.

I must frankly admit, however, that our objectively just position on this issue at the talks was seriously weakened on the tactical level in advance as a result of the following incident. It occurred when L.I. Brezhnev spoke with Chancellor H. Schmidt of the FRG in Moscow in summer 1980—i.e., shortly before the Soviet-American talks on the limitation of nuclear arms in Europe, which began in October that same year. By that time it was difficult for L.I. Brezhnev to carry on a serious conversation in general, and especially when he had to respond quickly to the questions he was asked. After hearing L.I. Brezhnev set forth our arguments (from a prepared text) regarding the absolute necessity of taking English and French nuclear systems into account, Schmidt essentially did not deny the accuracy of our position but asked whether or not we might postpone the discussion of English and French nuclear systems until the next set of strategic arms reduction talks. In response, L.I. Brezhnev apparently made some remark contradicting the views he had just set forth to the chancellor, absent-mindedly saying something to the effect that we would not exclude the possibility.

The West Germans' interpretation of this remark was not that the Soviet leader had said something wrong, as was the case, but that he had said too much, inadvertently revealing our alternative position (although we did not have one at that time). They reported this to the Americans and their other NATO allies, and there is no question that this affected the course of the subsequent talks.

Why Did We Withdraw Our Demand?

If our demand for the inclusion of English and French nuclear systems was completely justified, and the facts listed above confirm this, it is natural to wonder why we

ultimately gave up this demand and whether it will or will not threaten our security. After all, the failure to include English and French nuclear systems is also the reason for the difference in the numbers of Soviet and American missiles to be destroyed, which is the issue the Soviet people find the most confusing and disturbing.

A clear and concise answer to this question, in my opinion, was provided by M.S. Gorbachev when he said at the press conference in Reykjavik on 12 October 1986 that the consent to overlook the nuclear potential of France and England "was a very big concession on our part. After all, these two countries are allies of the United States and their nuclear potential is being built up and improved continuously. Furthermore, all of their military activities are closely coordinated within the NATO framework. We are completely aware of this. Nevertheless, we removed this obstacle."¹⁰ Yes, this was a big concession, M.S. Gorbachev repeated when he returned to Moscow and addressed the Soviet public on television on 14 October 1986, explaining the great cause for which we had made this concession: "We were proceeding from a realization of the need to pave the way for detente in Europe, to relieve the European people's fears of nuclear disaster, and to then move ahead—toward the elimination of all nuclear weapons."¹¹

Experience has confirmed the wisdom of this decision. It was precisely this bold move that put the United States in a position in which it was forced to agree to the complete elimination of its own intermediate-range missiles along with the Soviet ones. I am deliberately using the term "forced" because there is no real basis for the common assumption that we were the ones who accepted, and belatedly at that, the "zero option" President Reagan had proposed earlier.

Yes, Reagan did speak of the "zero option" in 1981, but subsequent events proved conclusively that this was only a propaganda ruse and that it was employed in the belief that the Soviet Union would never agree to this option. If anyone ever doubted this or still doubts this, I think these doubts would be dispelled if they read what former President R. Nixon, who was well aware of the mood in the White House, wrote in his book. "In November 1981," Nixon wrote, "when the United States proposed the 'zero option,' demanding the elimination of American and Soviet intermediate-range missiles in Europe, it did this not because this decision would be in the West's best interest, but because it expected the Russians to refuse and to suffer political injuries as a result. The proposal was expected to give Europe political points and allow the United States to deploy intermediate-range nuclear forces in the NATO countries. The tactic worked until the Soviet Union turned out to be implacable at the talks."

You should have seen how hard Washington tried to get free of the "zero option" when it was proposed quite seriously by the Soviet side and how hard the American administration tried to convince us to accept the "interim option," which would have allowed the United

States to keep at least some of its intermediate-range missiles in Western Europe. Then, as a result of our persistence and the pressure of the West European and world public, including the Americans, the United States eventually agreed to the "zero option." As the same Nixon wrote, "if the United States refuses, it will lose too much authority as far as public opinion in Western Europe is concerned."

When we look at the big picture, the United States' consent to the real "zero option" and not to its propagandistic "zero option," was also a concession, and no less of a concession that our consent to withdraw the demand for the inclusion of English and French nuclear systems. If we had not made this concession, there would be no treaty, just as there would be no treaty if the United States had not consented to the "zero option." In short, as M.S. Gorbachev remarked, each side conceded, but just enough to balance their interests in this sphere.

Therefore, the real purpose of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles and the main reason for its value to us—in addition to its universal value as the first step toward nuclear disarmament—is its reversal of the implementation of the NATO decision aimed at preserving and augmenting bloc advantages, and not at all the restoration of a balance of power that was supposedly disrupted by the Soviet Union's deployment of the SS-20 missiles.

They say that history does not acknowledge the word "if," meaning that it cannot be rewritten. This methodological procedure is completely acceptable, however, if we want to learn lessons from history. This is why it is sensible and reasonable to wonder if it might not have been better if we had "taken Reagan at his word" in 1981 and had consented at that time to the "zero option." In my opinion, we would probably have made many propaganda points, but this is as far as things would have gone. It is naive, in my opinion, to think that the result would have been the same as it is now.

First of all, we cannot forget that the conclusion of the INF Treaty required not only our willingness to accept the "zero option," but also much more, and that this became possible only after the advent of the new thinking.

Second, both sides had to go through Geneva and Reykjavik before, metaphorically speaking, the train of Soviet-American relations, including the cars carrying nuclear explosives, had picked up so much speed that it was impossible for Reagan to jump off the train when we proposed a genuine "zero option." If we had agreed to his "zero option" in 1981 under completely different circumstances, he would not have had much trouble evading it by talking his way out of it with propagandistic references to injuries.

Besides this, we must not forget that the INF Treaty is two "zeros," and not just one. It was of fundamental importance to us not to allow a situation in which the

United States would have to get rid of its intermediate-range missiles but would retain the ability to build up its operational-tactical missiles in Europe (as it planned to do). These are nuclear carriers with a range of 500-1,000 kilometers—i.e., they are capable of delivering strikes within the territory of the Warsaw Pact states, including part of the Soviet Union. Therefore, I repeat, the INF Treaty is not at all the same thing as the “zero option” President Reagan was talking about in 1981.

This is my view of the issue of the SS-20 missiles, which will soon cease to exist as such.

Footnotes

1. MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN, 1988, No 10, p 7.
 2. SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1988, No 12.
 3. “Otkuda iskhodit ugroza miru” [The Source of the Threat to Peace], 3d ed., Moscow, 1984, p 72.
 4. NOVOYE VREMYA, 1987, No 46, p 9.
 5. DEFENSE MONITOR, 1983, No 6, p 4.
 6. NATO REVIEW, February 1980, pp 25-26.
 7. KOELNER STADT-ANZEIGER, 19 February 1981.
 8. “Materialy XIX Vsesoyuznoy konferentsii Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza. 28 iyunya-1 iyulya 1988 goda” [Materials of the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference, 28 June-1 July 1988], Moscow, 1988, p 28.
 9. DER STERN, 9 August 1984, p 132.
 10. “Soviet-American Summit Meeting, Reykjavik, 11-12 October 1986,” Moscow, 1986, p 13.
 11. M.S. Gorbachev, “Izbrannyye rechi i statyi” [Selected Speeches and Articles], vol 4, Moscow, 1987, p 141. COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo “Nauka”,
- “SShA—ekonomika, politika, ideologiya”, 1989.

NOTES AND COMMENTS

Sweden's Role in U.S., NATO Military Strategy Examined

18030010c Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 89 (signed to press 17 Mar 89) pp 53-59

[Article by S.V. Morgachev: “The United States and the Swedish Variety of ‘Northern Balance’”]

[Text] A common prevailing ideology, the presence in Sweden of influential conservative forces eager to take Washington's side, and a certain degree of economic

dependence on the United States have all contributed to the extreme importance of the American factor in Swedish foreign policy.

The United States occasionally reminds Sweden of what it refers to as the morally detrimental aspects of neutrality per se. “The neutrality of some,” Secretary of State H. Kissinger once said in reference to Sweden, “is made possible by the commitments assumed by others.” It has been a long time, however, since the idea of a change in Sweden's status as a non-aligned state was regarded as a realistic possibility in the United States. Viewing Sweden's firm policy of non-alignment as an international reality which has won widespread international recognition, the United States is concentrating on strengthening the pro-Western thrust of this policy, creating the necessary conditions for the maximum use of this policy in its own politico-military interests, restricting Sweden's freedom of action in international affairs, and counteracting its steps toward detente and disarmament.

Sweden pursues a policy of “freedom from alliances in peacetime for the purpose of neutrality in wartime.” What are the implications of this? Above all, Sweden is naturally not a member of NATO. Therefore, there is no institutionalized mechanism of collaboration with this organization, the possibility of far-reaching forms of cooperation is excluded, and opportunities to exert pressure on Swedish foreign policy are limited. This is essential to an understanding of Sweden's role and place in contemporary international relations. By limiting the sphere of bloc policy, Sweden is making a positive contribution to the course of international events.

It is obvious, however, that political and military interaction can also be developed outside the mechanism of international organizations. Experts know of cases of Sweden's military cooperation with the United States (and with other NATO countries). They have included the regular exchange of military intelligence in line with certain agreements and cases in which the territory of Sweden and its military bases have been offered for use in training exercises, tests of military equipment, and cooperation in the training of military personnel. Many of the details of this interaction can be found in articles in the Swedish press. It is much more important, however, to understand the possible effects of this interaction on Swedish foreign policy and on politico-military relations in Northern Europe.

It is necessary to find a reasonable balance here. On the one hand, without an analysis of Western ties in Sweden's military policy, it would be difficult to understand its position in the international community. On the other hand, the augmentation of U.S. and NATO military potential and the military activity in Northern Europe made possible by cooperation with Sweden appear quite insignificant in the final analysis: If this cooperation were to end suddenly, the military situation in the north would not undergo any radical changes.

If Sweden's military contacts with the United States are viewed from the standpoint of confidence in Sweden's intention and ability to remain "neutral in wartime"—and the degree of this confidence, as a largely irrational concept in the nuclear age, is still affecting the political climate in the region—there is no reason to overestimate the significance of these contacts. It is quite probable that Sweden would take steps to curtail military cooperation with the West in a time of crisis because this kind of cooperation is most likely to pose a real additional threat to Sweden.

The overall political significance of discrepancies in the Swedish policy on military blocs is more distinct. The few tense episodes in the postwar history of international relations in Northern Europe include the incident in 1952, when two Swedish planes violated the airspace over Soviet territorial waters while conducting an operation jointly with the CIA, and the Finnish declaration of protest in 1974 when Sweden conducted reconnaissance operations (again, jointly with the CIA and against the USSR) on Finnish territory. Nevertheless, even when certain tendencies toward destabilization appear in the north of the continent, it is probable that their source is far beyond the bounds of Swedish foreign and military policy ties—in the military activity of the NATO bloc on the territory of Norway, Denmark, and Iceland and particularly in the part of the world ocean adjacent to Northern Europe.

It is impossible to assess the Swedish policy of "freedom from alliances" categorically because, to a considerable extent, this is only the freedom to adapt to military and foreign policy structures established outside Stockholm. Even a small country has chances to influence these structures, but they are limited, particularly during periods of tension in international relations. The political facts are such that Sweden's pro-Western and pro-American military stance is now built into the regional system of relations, and it would be unrealistic to expect significant changes in this sphere without far-reaching changes in the international situation as a whole.

The development of the global politico-military and military-technical situation makes the real value of the military efforts of a country like Sweden dubious. Its traditional policy of relying on armed forces of sizable dimensions for a small country, however, is still "afloat." Sweden has a well-equipped army and a developed military industry producing a broad variety of items, including modern military aircraft. Swedish firms have a solid reputation in the world arms market.

It would probably be wrong to seek the basis of Swedish military policy in military doctrine—i.e., in ideas about hypothetical military conflicts and the role of national armed forces in them—although this argument has been used widely in Swedish political thinking and official statements. At this time, however, it is no longer capable of serving as the main theoretical justification for the traditional military policy because of its highly conditional and vague nature and because of the uncertain

demands it makes on military expenditures and armed forces. This opinion is confirmed by the experience of Switzerland and Austria, where the military doctrines ultimately boil down to the idea that the armed forces of a small country can still be useful even in the nuclear age. Neither in Switzerland nor in Austria, however, has military construction reached the scales it has reached in Sweden, and this suggests that Swedish military policy has a more pragmatic basis.

There is no question that the Swedish military machine would be unable to keep revolving at such an impressive speed if it were not for the considerable interests of certain groups in the Swedish society—large-scale industry, the army, and the political parties and organizations connected with them. It must be said, however, that the policy of Sweden's Western partners, especially the United States, also has tremendous influence in this sphere.

It goes without saying that the United States is interested in intensive and ambitious military construction in Sweden because this presupposes requests for advanced military technology from the United States,¹ and this gives it important additional leverage to influence Sweden's behavior in international affairs. In its own interest, the United States—and not without the help of ruling circles in Sweden and the Scandinavian NATO countries—has established a quite effective mechanism of extreme interest to political scientists and is using the theory of the so-called "northern balance" as its theoretical shield.

According to this theory (or at least the part concerning Sweden's role), even the relative depletion of Sweden's armed forces could result in the creation of a military vacuum in the center of the region, which would be undesirable and dangerous for the great powers, would increase their military presence in Northern Europe, and would thereby escalate tendencies toward confrontation. Conversely, the continuation of Sweden's policy of intensive military construction has been declared an essential prerequisite for the stability of the international situation in the region. The United States, as a supporter of the "northern balance" theory and as a participant in the system of relations presumably validated by this theory, constantly warns Sweden against the curtailment of military efforts by implying that this move could be followed by an increase in the United States' own military activity.

The theory of the "northern balance" gives Swedish military policy what it needs so desperately and what it cannot get from any calculations based on hypothetical conflicts—namely, a simple and comprehensible reference point, a point of departure, a method of getting its bearings in relation to existing political realities. It also provides the groups inside and outside the country advocating intensive military construction in Sweden with a convenient line of reasoning regarding security and stability in Northern Europe. Forces with a genuine interest in real stability, however, must bear in mind that

the United States could use the curtailment of Swedish defense as an excuse for additional military undertakings in the north.

A memo sent out (according to reports in the press) in October 1979 by Secretary-General L. Leifland of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to some of the members of the bourgeois cabinet of that time is a characteristic example reflecting the complex situation created by the "northern balance" ideas in domestic political debates in Sweden. "The governments of Finland, England, the FRG, and the United States," he wrote, according to SVENSKA DAGBLADET, "have announced their worries about the possible weakening of Swedish defense.... If Sweden reduces its national defense forces, they will suggest a stronger NATO presence in Northern Europe. The Swedish government and parliament must be fully aware that the great powers will come into contact more often if Swedish defense continues to grow weaker. This could jeopardize stability in the north."

The desire to have armed forces resembling a scale model of the armies of the great powers (with the exception, of course, of nuclear and some other components) creates the need for technical and economic cooperation with one of these powers and makes high demands on military information and on the training of military personnel. This is why Sweden has solicited the aid of the special services and military training centers of the United States and its NATO partners. Under these conditions, Sweden has to reciprocate in ways meeting the politico-military interests of the Western powers. Without this kind of relationship, the United States' opportunities to include Sweden in its policy in this part of the world would be far fewer in number and more subject to changes in political conditions and in the views of certain officials in Stockholm. There is reason to believe that the Swedish policy of military construction is the decisive link in the group of factors and conditions contributing to the distinct disparities in its politico-military relations with countries belonging to opposing military blocs. Switzerland and Austria (comparisons to these countries are difficult to avoid in a discussion of Sweden's distinctive international position) attach less importance to military means of safeguarding their security, and this is the reason for the absence of these disparities in their foreign policy. Ideological and economic attachments to the West are not enough to make these disparities inevitable, and this point seems particularly important.

In 1982, under pressure from the United States, Stockholm ordered the material and technical supply administration of the Swedish army to oversee the observance of American export regulations by 20 of the largest Swedish firms, and in 1986 Stockholm issued an order on government control of exports of high-technology products. It went into effect on 1 July 1986 and said that foreign high-technology products covered by the export restrictions of the manufacturing country could not be sent out of Sweden without authorization from the appropriate agencies in that country, and that all

Swedish enterprises exporting high-technology products with foreign components would have to submit this kind of authorization to Swedish customs officials. "This is one of the great untold stories of our time—the story of how the demand for American technology forces neutral countries to cooperate with us," U.S. Assistant Secretary of Commerce P. Freedenberg stressed in January 1987.

In April 1986 Swedish firms were issued a new list of rules, obligating them to create special agencies to monitor the observance of American legislation and authorizing American embassy personnel to conduct on-site audits, including the interrogation of personnel and the examination of documents. These rules supplemented the ones the Swedish companies had already pledged to observe in the letters of affirmation they signed at the end of the 1960's (to not export products with American components without the permission of the U.S. Department of Commerce, to sell such products only to the final users, and to assist American officials in acquiring the information they need about the use of American products).

As leverage, fines were levied on companies accused of conducting trade operations with socialist countries without the appropriate authorization from the American authorities, and the companies were blacklisted, meaning that they could not obtain licenses to acquire American high-technology products. Ten companies had been blacklisted by the middle of 1985. Sweden's military-technological dependence on the United States was also used: Participation by American firms in the production of the new Swedish Gripen military aircraft was made dependent on compliance with American export regulations. The outcome of the struggle over the re-export of American technology was essentially predetermined. A key factor was Sweden's low level of self-sufficiency in various types of microelectronic components. For this reason, the country depends on supplies of these components from abroad, and especially from the United States. The director of the Ericsson electrical equipment concern, an internationally renowned firm and one of the largest companies in Sweden, stressed that "our dependence on imports, especially from the United States, is substantial and irreversible.... Cutting off our access to technology would be worse than an economic blockade. For this reason, we have to follow American rules."

The "great story" came to an end in May 1987, when the U.S. secretary of commerce announced that Swedish enterprises would be given access to American technology on the same terms as enterprises in France, the FRG, Great Britain, and Japan. This meant that the applications of Swedish firms for export licenses would be given relatively quick consideration and would not be subject to U.S. Defense Department controls. In essence, this was an offer of the maximum trade privileges previously extended only to members of the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Control (CoCom).

Ruling circles in Sweden have characteristically had an uncritical view of U.S. foreign policy and a near-idealized view of the American society. Negative assessments of U.S. actions on the international scene are rarely voiced by spokesmen for the Moderate Coalition Party (the largest bourgeois party in Sweden and the furthest to the right of the parliamentary parties). On the contrary, there is no shortage of statements referring directly or indirectly to the United States as the stronghold of democracy and progress and as a state with deeply friendly feelings for Sweden and with interests close to Sweden's own. An event such as MCP Chairman C. Bildt's visit to the Pentagon and the CIA in 1983 to discuss Sweden's military security and its efforts to counteract the "Soviet military threat" does not seem extraordinary in this context.

Pro-American feelings have recently grown perceptibly stronger in another large bourgeois party—the People's Party. This new mood is largely connected with the new party chairman, B. Westerberg. SVENSKA DAGBLADET quoted his remark that "we never agreed with the theory of the equal responsibility of the superpowers. The democracy and openness in the American society are a source of inspiration and the hope of peace." These words sound like a political creed. Traditionally, these views have also been characteristic of military circles. The belief that the Soviet Union is a potential aggressor and that the United States can be relied upon for help in the event of an "invasion from the east" is a deeply ingrained stereotype in the military community. "The American society and its military doctrines," wrote former defense staff member O. Lofgren, "are not discussed or analyzed at staff conferences. The attaches keep track of the development of military equipment, and not the possible consequences of actions by Reagan and the Pentagon.... The data in reports on military security refer almost exclusively to the Warsaw Pact.... The military's preoccupation with the threat from the east and ignorance of matters connected with the United States combine to make up a onesided and distorted picture of potential threats." We can assume that these stereotypes are gradually losing their strength, but we must not delude ourselves about the speed of this process.

The activities of pro-American forces in Sweden are based on a group of ideological factors and material and corporative considerations: They include ideological intolerance verging on overt anticommunism, the direct interest of big industry, with the strongest links to the Moderate Coalition and People's parties, in cooperation with the United States, and the military leadership's interest in this cooperation.

There is no question that members of the Social Democratic Labor Party of Sweden also attach great significance to the maintenance of economic and political relations with the United States on a high level and do not forget that the two countries belong to the same social order. Nevertheless, the Social Democrats (and, to a considerable extent, the bourgeois Center Party and

certain groups in the People's Party) are distinguished by a different type of political thinking—less burdened by mistaken ideas with ideological underpinnings, more open to East-West dialogue, and more objective and realistic.

The leaders of the Social Democratic Labor Party, which has been in power throughout the postwar period with the exception of a brief interval from 1976 to 1982, are known in the international community, just as many leaders of the Swedish political center, for their objective assessments of events in world politics. They criticize the unequivocal efforts the United States made until just recently to achieve military supremacy over the Soviet Union.

The statements by Swedish officials against the U.S. aggression in Vietnam, Grenada, and Libya and against U.S. policy in Central America are well known. The protection of the rights of small and weak states in those cases when Sweden feels that they have been violated is regarded as a contribution to Sweden's own security over the long range, because it is also only a small state in the final analysis.

Some Western political scientists who have interpreted Sweden's criticism of the United States have said that the statements were made in part to create a counterbalance to Sweden's politico-military ties to this great power and thereby strengthen the image of the Swedish policy of "freedom from alliances."

In any case, the United States has openly expressed objections to the anti-American statements of Swedish officials. In 1986 a SVENSKA DAGBLADET correspondent who had spoken with people in the U.S. State Department said that influential groups in Washington, especially in the Reagan administration, were obviously irritated by O. Palme's resolute criticism of U.S. foreign policy. It is not surprising that he never received an official invitation to visit Washington when he was prime minister.

Swedish officials have had considerable experience in dealing with the overseas partner and are in no hurry to "conform" to each new nuance in American policy. An indicative episode took place in February 1988, when Prime Minister I. Carlsson addressed American congressmen in an article in AFTONBLADET and asked them to refuse President Reagan's request for additional funds for anti-government forces in Nicaragua. The United States issued a diplomatic protest in response to this publication.

People in Stockholm frequently underscore the similarity of the United States and Sweden as countries belonging to the same social order, but they feel no need to attach some kind of absolute significance to this similarity. This is certainly in line with the nature of Swedish neutrality, which is profoundly pragmatic on the level of doctrine and on the level of practice.

In Swedish and Western literature the question of the United States' fundamental position on Sweden's neutrality is usually either ignored or is answered as it was in an article by famous American analyst S. Canby. "Sweden," he remarked in an article in SURVIVAL, "secured the political and military balance in the north, which was highly convenient for NATO, much more convenient than Sweden's membership would have been."

In principle, the United States would certainly want to have Sweden as an official military ally. The minutes of a meeting of a foreign ministers of Norway and Denmark, E. Hauge and H. Petersen, in Oslo in January 1951,² made available to the public in 1984, can be regarded as proof that this was the case in the first postwar decade.

It is quite a different matter that there has always been a pro-NATO lobby in Sweden, but it has never been strong enough to question the country's position on alliances. The United States has never resorted to flagrant political and economic pressure on Sweden, not even in the postwar years. It is probable that uncertainty about the success of these measures was one of the deciding factors. Besides this, potential international repercussions had to be taken into consideration, as well as the possibility of politico-military cooperation with Sweden despite its non-aligned status. This made it all the more difficult for the United States to decide to take vigorous action in the 1970's and 1980's, when the international situation in Europe had acquired considerable inertia, strategic parity was established between East and West, and small and non-aligned countries began playing a perceptible role in international affairs. International relations were developing in a direction restricting the United States' freedom of action. In this context, it would be no exaggeration to say that the strength of the Soviet Union and its foreign policy, aimed at securing international stability, and the removal of power politics from the international arena were and are an important factor of Sweden's policy of non-alignment.

Footnotes

1. Around 30 percent of Sweden's demand for weapons (in cost terms) is covered by imports, almost exclusively from the NATO countries, and the main supplier is the United States. Substantial quantities of military items are manufactured with foreign licenses, especially American ones.

2. The minutes indicate that in the beginning of the 1950's the possibility of Sweden's membership in the North Atlantic bloc was being discussed in the United States, Great Britain, Norway, and Denmark. Furthermore, the United States and Great Britain wanted a Swedish officer to be appointed commander-in-chief of NATO forces in Northern Europe. This was regarded as something like a concession to Sweden.

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BOOK REVIEWS

U.S. Book on Psychology of Nuclear Weapons Reviewed

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[Review by A.V. Churmanteyev of book "Minds at War. Nuclear Reality and the Inner Conflicts of Defense Policymakers" by Steven Kull, New York, Basic Books, 1988, X + 341 pages: "Psychological Barriers in the Way of the New Thinking"]

[Text] This book is another attempt to answer questions about possible ways of averting a worldwide nuclear holocaust. The author, the young but already famous American political scientist Steven Kull, came to political science from psychology, and this is one of the main reasons for the distinctive features of this study focusing on the psychological aspects of military-strategic issues. He concentrates on the influence of the "nuclear revolution" on the thinking of the political and military leaders involved in making and conducting national defense policy.

Kull begins by stating the existence of two basic currents in contemporary politico-military thinking and defines them as the "adaptive" and "traditional" currents. Representatives of the "adaptive" current are distinguished by the realization that the presence of nuclear weapons changes the role of military force in relations between states dramatically and that national security policy should be revised accordingly (p 5). Supporters of the "traditional" approach are inclined to underestimate the significance of nuclear weapons, basing their assumptions on the old idea of war as a means of attaining political goals (p 9). The excerpts the author cites from speeches and official statements by political leaders, works by experts, and other sources testify that these currents came into being almost immediately following the invention of the atomic bomb and have had a perceptible effect on the research of American military theorists ever since that time.

The author analyzes the traditional approach at length, because he believes that this is still the prevailing point of view in American politics. In a discussion of the main results of this approach, Kull includes not only the American side's efforts to maintain nuclear parity with the USSR, but also the development and production of new types of offensive nuclear arms and the emphasis on strategic systems of the type envisaged in the SDI. The author feels that the statements (direct or indirect) by several American military theorists about the possibility of victory or a "relatively favorable outcome" in a nuclear conflict between the United States and the USSR are a vivid example of traditional thinking.

Kull says that after the level of "mutual assured destruction" has been reached, any further buildup of nuclear potential to secure supremacy is senseless from the

purely military standpoint. For the same reasons, in Kull's opinion, there is no military-strategic need for the continued improvement of nuclear weapons for the purpose of heightened reliability, accuracy, etc. This also applies to the development of strategic ABM systems (p 30).

Therefore, the traditional approach, which is based on the beliefs of the pre-nuclear period, is completely inappropriate, in Kull's opinion, for the current situation.

The author conducted several anonymous interviews to determine the arguments lying at the basis of this line of reasoning. In all, he interviewed more than 80 people, including individuals occupying (in the past or present) fairly high positions in the U.S. political system—secretaries of defense, senators, presidential advisers, and others. The interviews were informal, without any set script, and the author displayed considerable skill in conducting them. The friendly atmosphere fostered a high level of trust on the part of the respondents, but the author was adamant in his efforts to learn the basic premises of this point of view and stopped every attempt by the respondents to evade questions or to confine their answers to mere declarative statements.

The analysis of these interviews is the most interesting and informative part of the book. It provides conclusive proof that the real reasons why the overwhelming majority of experts and politicians supported a strategy based on old pre-nuclear principles have little in common with the officially declared reasons, such as the need to "deter" or "intimidate" an aggressor or to maintain the "balance of power." Even the officials who first cited arguments such as "more weapons mean more security" were quick to acknowledge the groundlessness of this position. Nevertheless, they continued to insist on the need to conduct a traditional policy, saying that the overwhelming majority of politicians and private citizens (in the USSR and in the United States) were not ready to admit the need to revise the basic principles of defense policy and that a unilateral renunciation of these principles might have disastrous consequences. If one side has quantitative superiority in strategic offensive arms, for example, it might regard this as a favorable opportunity to start and win a nuclear war, and that is why unconditional parity must be maintained even after the level of "mutual assured destruction" has been reached.

Other typical arguments consisted in the assumption that although the quantitative and qualitative growth of nuclear weapons and the work on massive programs like the SDI might be senseless from the military standpoint, they enhance the nation's prestige in the world community and this, in turn, can influence the Third World countries' choice of a future course of development.

In some cases the author was able to convince these officials of the flaws in these arguments: Many agreed that a policy based on obviously mistaken assumptions and aimed at encouraging the majority to share these

mistaken assumptions could hardly be expected to have a positive long-range impact. Nevertheless, they did not change their minds regarding the need to adhere to the traditional policy, primarily citing purely psychological reasons as the justification. The most frequent comment was that nuclear potential has to be augmented to maintain the necessary level of national pride and national morale, to diminish the fear of a possible nuclear holocaust, and to satisfy the "natural human need" for competition.

Soviet readers will be particularly interested in the part of the book in which the author analyzes the interviews he conducted in the Soviet Union. It is true that they were far fewer in number (30 in the USSR as compared to 84 in the United States) and that it was difficult to gain access to high-level Soviet political and military officials. Most of the interviews were granted by scholars from academy research institutes engaged in the study of military strategy. Despite the differences in the composition of the two groups, the American and Soviet experts had virtually the same basic views and cited the same arguments to validate them. Of course, some differences were also revealed (for example, virtually none of the Soviet experts spoke of the possibility of a "relatively favorable outcome" in a nuclear conflict between the USSR and the United States), but the most striking thing is the amazing similarity of the arguments used to explain the need to maintain the balance of nuclear forces, improve missile systems, etc.

On the basis of these results, the author concludes that the main reason for the reluctance to give up obsolete ideas is the unconscious wish to satisfy psychological needs.

Of course, the author could be accused of putting too much emphasis on the psychological aspects of the problem of man's adaptation to the realities of the nuclear age. There is probably no good reason to disregard the ideological, political, and economic interests behind the reluctance of many politicians to reconsider the entire group of issues connected with national security in an atmosphere of nuclear confrontation. The experimental part of the study offers conclusive proof, however, that psychological factors play a much more important role than we expect in international politics. Besides this, the author's main conclusion—that the establishment of the new political thinking as the norm in world politics will be impossible until serious psychological barriers have been surmounted—seems accurate. He believes that the acceptance of the new political thinking by military policymakers will be impossible without a profound awareness of all of the motives lying at the basis of traditional political strategies, and this, in turn, will depend on the broadest possible dissemination of accurate information about changes in the nuclear sphere on the international scene. In the author's opinion, it will be extremely important to shift the emphasis in the rivalry between the two great powers from the politico-military sphere to economics, science, and sports.

This book by American researcher Steven Kull will make a perceptible contribution to the study of man's adaptation to the realities of the nuclear era.

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Book on U.S.-Canadian Economic Interaction Reviewed

18030010e Moscow SSHA: *EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA* in Russian No 4, Apr 89 (signed to press 17 Mar 89) p 100

[Report by L.A. Bagramov on book "SShA-Kanada: vzaimodeystviye natsionalnykh ekonomicheskikh tsikov" [United States-Canada: Interaction of National Economic Cycles] by V.V. Popov, Moscow, Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya, 1988, 208 pages]

[Text] In his new monograph V.V. Popov cogently demonstrates how the economic cycles in the leading capitalist nation influence the economic development of a "medium-sized" country extremely dependent on the United States—Canada.

Trade is the main element of the cycle-transferring mechanism. During periods of economic crisis in the United States, Canadian exports to that country are reduced and Canadian imports from it are reduced far more.

In other words, the balance of trade changes in Canada's favor. In the final analysis, however, changes in the direction of the flow of trade usually cause depression in the Canadian economy because the reduction of exports is followed by a critical slump in Canadian production, and the reduction of imports occurs after the American crisis spreads to Canada.

Changes in the directional flow of loan capital also have an adverse effect on the Canadian economy. The rise in interest rates at the end of periods of prosperity and during periods of crisis in the United States leads unavoidably to the reduction of American portfolio investments in Canada, and this also causes the deterioration of Canadian economic conditions. Changes in the directional flow of entrepreneurial capital, on the other hand, might transfer American cyclical impulses to Canada, but only after a slight delay. At the most, they can influence the course of the cyclical crisis in Canada, but cannot start it (pp 167-168).

American TNC's serve as the most effective instrument for the transfer of cyclical fluctuations from Canada to the United States. During periods of crisis they stop production at their head enterprises and increase the load of capacities in their branches and subsidiaries.

Another element is the migration of manpower. In cases when the United States has already been seized by crisis and Canada is still experiencing a period of prosperity, the transfer of manpower from the South to the North

increases demand in the Canadian labor market and thereby prevents the decline of business profits.

The bold and original statements and discerning approach to bourgeois theories in V.V. Popov's monograph are combined with the scrupulous examination of colossal quantities of statistics and facts.

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